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Urgent and unprecedented environmental 
and social changes challenge scientists to define 
a new social contract. This contract represents 
a commitment on the part of all scientists to 
devote their energies and talents to the most 
pressing problems of the day in proportion to their 
importance, in exchange for public funding. 
The new and unmet needs of society include more 
comprehensive information, understanding, and 
technologies for society to move towards a more 
sustainable biosphere – one which is ecologically 
sound, economically feasible, and socially just. 
New research, faster and more effective 
transmission of new and existing knowledge 
to policy- and decision-makers, and better 
communication of this knowledge to the public 
will all be required to meet this challenge.
Extract from Jane Lubchenco’s Inaugural Speech as incoming 
President of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, ‘Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social 
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I have found this Foreword quite difficult to write. Forty 
years practice of expressing my thoughts in a particular 
‘scientific’ way is hard to change. But the core conclusions 
of the report – that we climate scientists need to reflect 
critically on what we do and take steps to better match it 
with societal needs – apply to us all. My experiences having moved 
from experimental space science, through running large international 
research programmes and a research institute, to running the 
science museum in London, have convinced me that our training 
and development has left us insufficiently prepared to contribute as 
effectively as we should both to public policy, and to communicating 
our results and conclusions to society more generally. We are 
especially ill-equipped to deal with controversy in the media and to 
respond to public attacks on our motivations and behaviours.    
It was this background that led UCL to establish a Policy Commission to 
consider how to improve the communication of climate science. Originally 
the plan was to focus on what could be learned usefully from the ‘mind 
sciences’. However, as the project developed the need became apparent 
to extend its remit to gain a wider and deeper understanding of the ways 
that climate science is conducted and how its results are delivered to 
society. The outcome has been a fascinating journey of discovery into areas 
not commonly explored by climate scientists – and some conclusions that 
may themselves raise some controversy.   
For my own part, the exercise has brought home sharply the extent to 
which every one of us is vulnerable to being misled by ‘common sense’ 
explanations of complex evidence, events and circumstances. The fact 
that as a scientist I have not previously invested appropriate effort into 
FoReWoRd
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evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of my primary research 
instrument – my mind – is salutary. As a physicist, the realization that 
evolution has honed my mind to seek ‘meaning in context’, rather than 
an ever more perfect representation of the world, is profound. The result 
is a heightened recognition of the need constantly and with determination 
to scrutinize my own emotions and thought processes – to step outside 
and ‘see myself see’ - in order to minimise the possibility of unwitting 
bias and faulty reasoning. The same need applies to everyone involved in 
the climate science discourse.
This Report thus explores issues which the Commission considered to 
have previously been given insufficient attention. The primary audience 
is the climate science community, their employers and those who 
educate and train climate scientists, especially those individuals amongst 
these groups who perceive and are concerned about a mismatch 
between existing practices and societal needs. The conclusions and 
recommendations offer ways in which the expertise and impact of the 
climate science community can be strengthened. Such reforms alone will 
not be sufficient to achieve a more constructive and effective formulation 
of policy and an improved public discourse, but they provide a crucial 
step towards achieving those objectives.
May 2014
Prof Chris Rapley CBE
Chair, UCL Policy Commission on Communicating Climate Science
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l   Climate scientists are finding themselves ill-prepared to engage with 
the often emotionally, politically and ideologically charged public 
discourse on the evaluation and use of their science. This is proving 
unhelpful to evidence-based policy formulation, and is damaging their public 
standing. As a result, there is a pressing need to re-examine and clarify the 
roles of climate scientists in policy, decision-making and public engagement. 
Their professional norms, values and practices need to be reconsidered and 
revised accordingly. In expanding their skills and expertise to better match 
societal needs, climate scientists can benefit from a mutually supportive 
working relationship with social and behavioural scientists, and with experts 
in public engagement and communication. Such reforms alone will not be 
sufficient to achieve a more constructive and effective formulation of policy 
and an improved public discourse, but they provide a crucial step toward 
those objectives.
l   A climate science ‘meta-narrative’ is required that delivers the results of 
climate science in a manner that is accurate, engaging, coherent, relevant, 
and which – by making clear the limits of certainty and knowledge – is robust 
against new discoveries and unfolding events. Multiple narrative threads, that 
are consistent and harmonious with each other, are necessary both to reflect 
the complex nature of the climate science, and to connect with audiences 
with different states of knowledge, interests, values and needs.  
l   Policy issues raised by climate science are complicated by many 
factors such as decisions on energy, food and water supplies, quality of 
life, equity, affordability, security, sustainability and societal resilience. Whilst 
climate science can inform such policy deliberations, it cannot be their arbiter. 
Decision-making should not be through the ‘linear’ mode, characterized as 
‘truth speaks to power’, but by a collective process (‘co-production’) in which 
all interested parties, including the public, play their part.
ConCLUsions
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l   Efforts to understand the climate system better are important, 
but they should not be allowed to divert attention and effort from 
decision-making and policy formulation based on what is already 
known and can be addressed. Reducing uncertainties in some areas 
may not always be possible but irreducible uncertainties can be addressed 
using a ‘decision pathways’ approach, which retains flexibility through the 
identification of multiple options and decision points.
l   at its root, the public discussion of climate science is as much about 
what sort of world we wish to live in, and hence about ethics and 
values, as it is about material risks to human wellbeing. This needs to 
be clearly acknowledged and addressed by climate scientists, policymakers 
and others engaged in the discussion. Establishing a positive and active 
public discourse requires recognizing that people’s feelings, beliefs, inner 
conflicts and world views strongly influence the way that they receive and 
assimilate information.
l   new organisational mechanisms are required to support the public 
discourse on climate science and to achieve necessary professional 
reforms – notably a forum for active public discussion and a professional 
body for climate scientists.
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Communication
there is a need for an operational means for the general public and climate 
scientists to engage in dialogue, and for the provision of a coherent ‘meta-
narrative’ of climate science that conveys the big picture and provides the 
context for discussion of the results, their uncertainties and their 
implications. The authentic and personalised voice of climate scientists in the 
formation and delivery of this ‘meta-narrative’ will be crucial. It will require the 
climate science community to develop and discuss the narrative in a way that 
seeks to increase the transparency of the scientific process and to strengthen 
public participation within it. The effective communication of this ‘meta-narrative’ 
will rely on successful use of and engagement with the media and the internet.
training
There is a need to enhance the training and development of climate scientists. 
Specifically the objective is to equip the community as a whole with the skills to fulfill 
the roles of ‘pure scientist’, ‘science communicator’, ‘science arbiter’, ‘issue 
advocate’ and ‘honest broker of policy alternatives’. This will require effective action 
on the part of funders and universities to support and deliver the necessary training. 
The broader aim is to strengthen the functioning and transparency of the climate 
science process, and the degree of public participation within it. 
Policy
Climate scientists should participate actively in the ‘co-production’ of policy 
formulation and the decision-making process. This entails contributing their 
expertise alongside other experts and stakeholders to inform the deliberations  
of those with the authority, responsibility and accountability to make decisions. 
Progress will require a willingness and openness on the part of Government  
and other policy stakeholders, as well as climate scientists, to commit to such  
an approach.
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ReCommendations
Leadership
a professional body for climate scientists should be established to provide  
a unifying purpose and to offer leadership. Its roles should be as follows:
-  Representation: to represent the interests of scientists and of society.
-  Voice: To provide the means for climate scientists to develop and communicate 
the climate science ‘meta-narrative’ and to work with experts in wider aspects of 
public engagement and communication to support this.
-  standards: To define professional norms, values and practices appropriate to 
societal needs and provide guidance and input to improve the training and 
development of climate scientists accordingly.
-  outcome: To support climate scientists in engaging in co-production of policy by 
defining the associated roles and expectations, and by providing a clear route for 
engagement between the climate science community and policymakers. 
To these ends the body should facilitate a mutually supportive working relationship 
between climate scientists, social and behavioural scientists, and key stakeholders, 
with the aim of applying relevant insights to the practice of climate science.
Self-reflection
Active critical self-reflection and humility should become the evident and 
habitual cultural norm on the part of all participants in the climate discourse. 
We need to be vigilant in scrutinising how we evaluate evidence and judge others. 
We are all less rational and more rationalizing than we think. 
                 11
CHaPteR sUmmaRies
1 
Clarifying the science–Policy interface
Responsibility, authority and accountability for decision-making and policy 
formulation should lie transparently with the relevant decision-makers, 
policymakers and politicians. Climate science can inform, but should not 
arbitrate, policy; rather climate scientists and policymakers need to work 
together, and with other experts and the public, to develop and practice a ‘co-
production’ approach to policymaking. There are five key roles which climate 
scientists should collectively fulfil: ‘Pure Scientist’, ‘Science Communicator’, 
‘Science Arbiter’, ‘Issue Advocate’ and ‘Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives’.
2
What is inside our minds?
Disagreement within climate discourse is more to do with differences in values 
and world-views, and our propensity for social evaluations, than it is about 
scientific facts. Climate science contains enough complexity and ambiguity to 
support a variety of positions. Simply providing more facts will not resolve the 
disagreements.
Findings from the social and behavioural sciences explain how people, given 
identical evidence, can come to opposing conclusions. They also provide 
an explanation for people’s natural inclination to denigrate those who hold 
opposing convictions. Taken together, these two insights help to explain the 
contested nature of climate science. An understanding of these issues can 
help climate scientists to better carry out their role as Pure Scientists, as well 
as to interact with the public more effectively and productively.
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3
strengthening the Public standing of Climate science
Climate science is complex, and its results are unwelcome, inconvenient 
and contested. It cannot be easily rendered into simple truths. Furthermore, 
the climate science community is very broad and lacks a coherent unified 
voice. The internet offers opportunities for greater transparency and public 
participation in climate science, whilst the concept of ‘brand DNA’ provides a 
helpful means of identifying ways to strengthen the coherency and credibility 
of climate science’s messages. One way for climate scientists to engage more 
effectively with society and with policymakers is to encourage and inform 
discourse on tractable, ‘no or low’ regret ways forward. These should address 
different benefits on different timescales, starting with the near term. 
4
Capturing an engaged audience
Narrative offers a powerful means to engage an audience and convey complex 
concepts. Climate scientists can gain much by working with and learning 
from those expert in public discourse, including the arts, museum sector and 
media. When talking to the lay public about climate science, scientists should 
avoid undue reliance on the ‘information deficit’ approach and overcome 
their reluctance to employ the elements of successful narrative, including 
personalizing their story, drawing on emotions and expressing their opinions. 
Dialogue, rather than debate, offers the means to identify common purpose and 
foster constructive, evidence-based discourse.
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Continued >
5 
How Climate Change Features in the Public Consciousness
There is widespread public acceptance of the reality of climate change, but not of 
the urgency and scale of the challenges that the science indicates it represents. 
This discrepancy derives from psychological factors and from cues from influential 
elites and the media. There is a need to reframe the public discourse in a way that 
circumvents existing entrenched positions to engage climate scientists and other 
experts with policymakers and society more generally to evaluate the scientific 
evidence and determine the appropriate responses.
6
Rising to the Challenge
In an ideal world, the climate science community would have a clear 
understanding of its purpose and objectives, pursue proactive engagement with 
society and policy through a clear narrative of climate science, engage in dialogue 
rather than debate, and be aware of the need for active self-reflection. It would 
support a productive discourse on the challenges of climate change and would 
address a number of fundamental needs, including: a forum for authoritative public 
conversation; a means for representing climate science in societal engagement; 
professional credentials and standards for climate scientists; and high standards 
of education and training. 
A means to achieve these ends would be the establishment of a professional 
body for climate science, to represent the interests of both climate scientists 
and of society, and to develop norms, values and practices better tuned to the 
circumstances in which climate science finds itself.
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A New eRA foR 
ClimAte SCieNCe
KeY PoiNtS
   Climate science as currently practised finds itself mismatched 
to societal needs.
   Climate scientists need to reconsider their roles and expand 
their knowledge and skills accordingly.
   A change in the relationship between climate science and 
society is required.
Introduction
 In 1997 Jane Lubchenco, the newly appointed President of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, delivered an inaugural speech 
entitled Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for 
Science1. In it she emphasized that humans have emerged as a new force 
of nature, dominating the planet, and potentially threatening its life support 
systems. As a result, it is incumbent on researchers “privileged to be able to 
indulge their passion for science – and simultaneously to provide something 
useful to society” to consider carefully their responsibilities and to seek to 
fulfil them to the best of their abilities. She invited the environmental science 
community to “participate vigorously in exploring the relationship between 
science and society and in considering a New Social Contract for Science 
as we enter the Century of the Environment”. The speech and its publication 
generated much interest, and were widely hailed as visionary.
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In the subsequent 17 years climate science has developed into a major 
enterprise. The number of researchers working in the field now runs to tens, 
if not hundreds, of thousands worldwidei. In 2013 alone around 13,000 
papers were published under the classification ‘global climate change’ or 
similarii, and US research expenditure via the US Global Change Research 
Program, corresponding to about half of that worldwide, amounted to 
some $2.5 billion2.
Yet, over that same period, notwithstanding some notable exceptions, the 
day-to-day practices of the majority of climate researchers has changed 
relatively little. Whilst a growing subset have involved themselves in the 
communication of results beyond their scientific peers, and some have 
participated in forms of societal decision-making and policy formulation, 
the primary focus and motivation for most remains the carrying out and 
publication of original research. Neither the ‘vigorous debate’ encouraged 
by Lubchenco, nor a resulting shift in emphasis, has taken place. 
In the meantime, the public discourse has become fractious and polarized. 
The results of climate science are routinely dismissed, and climate scientists 
denigrated3–5. The climate science community is finding it difficult to marshal 
a coherent and effective response6.
This is very unhelpful, given the enormity of what is at stake. If society fails to 
respond appropriately to climate risk the consequences could be irreversible. 
Answers to the questions ‘Are humans disrupting the climate system?’ 
and ‘What will happen if they are?’ address objective realities amenable to 
scientific enquiry. The determination of what could, and should, be done 
in response are issues that can be illuminated, but not decided, by climate 
i  The American Geophysical Union (AGU) has a membership of over 61,000 in 144 nations. 
More than 70% of AGU members classify themselves in a field of research that contributes 
to climate science. However, only a subset would regard themselves as climate scientists. 
Many climate scientists are not AGU members.
ii  The figure derives from a Web of Science search with ‘global climate change’ as the topic.
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science. A thoughtful, well-informed and constructive public discussion is 
merited. Procrastination is potentially risky.
But progress is hindered by an increasingly entrenched battle between 
those who accept that transformative action is necessary and those 
who do not. Climate science is centre stage and is regularly employed 
in a selective manner by protagonists seeking to justify their stance and 
vanquish opposing views. As well as undermining the ability of society to 
address effectively the climate change issue, this is proving detrimental to 
the standing of science and to the reputation of scientists, and threatens to 
weaken the role of scientific evidence in wise, democratic decision-making.
What is going on? Why is it that the results of multiple lines of scientific 
enquiry regarded as robust by specialists are dismissed – even ridiculed 
– with determination and contempt? How can climate scientists 
communicate their messages more effectively? How can their contribution 
to the climate change discourse and policy formulation be improved to 
benefit the public good?
This report considers these and related questions. We explore the 
intersection of science and societal decision-making, and summarise  
recent thinking on the roles and obligations of researchers carrying out 
‘policy-relevant’ scienceiii. We draw on the insights of the social and 
behavioural sciences to demonstrate the need for active critical reflection 
on the part of climate scientists, as well as all others involved in the public 
discourse on climate science. We discuss the forces at work in the formation 
of societal reactions to the results and implications of climate science, and 
especially the propensity for widely differing interpretations of evidence and 
antagonism to others. We identify a number of issues that threaten the public 
standing of climate scientists, and consider how these can be addressed.
Based on our analysis, we identify ways in which climate scientists 
could usefully enhance their knowledge and expertise, and strengthen 
iii  By which we mean science that is relevant to significant issues of public policy.
 
their approach, recognising that this is a necessary but insufficient 
condition to improve the effectiveness of the public discourse. We 
recommend the creation of a communications forum for climate science, 
and of a professional body for climate scientists. The purpose of the 
communications forum is to engage actively with the public in a discourse 
on the results and implications of climate science, thereby building interest, 
understanding and trust, and to develop and convey a ‘meta-narrative’ 
which is accurate, engaging, coherent and relevant, and which – by 
making clear the limits of certainty and knowledge – is robust against new 
discoveries and unfolding events. The purpose of the professional body 
is to provide a means to represent the interests of climate scientists and 
those of society, and to provide the necessary means and the leadership 
to develop and implement professional norms, values and practices that 
match the needs of the modern world.
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 Chapter 1
ClARifYiNg the SCieNCe–PoliCY 
iNteRfACe
KeY PoiNtS
   The ‘linear’ or ‘technocratic’ model of science informing climate 
policy is inappropriate. Climate scientists and policymakers 
need to work together, and with other experts and the public, to 
develop and practice a ‘co-production’ approach.
   Responsibility, authority and accountability for decision-making 
and policy formulation should lie transparently with the relevant 
decision-makers, policymakers and politicians. 
  Climate science should inform policy decisions but should not 
be their arbiter.
   Climate scientists should collectively fulfil five roles: ‘Pure 
Scientist’, ‘Science Communicator’, ‘Science Arbiter’, ‘Issue 
Advocate’ and ‘Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives’.
   Climate scientists and political scientists need to engage with 
and learn from each other.
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1.6 Summary 39 
1.1 The ‘Linear Model’
 Explicit within Jane Lubchenco’s 1997 rallying call was the recognition 
that the established post-Second World War ‘linear’ relationship between 
science and policy – characterised as ‘truth speaks to power, and power 
responds’ – needed reconsideration. Mike Hulme, in his book Why We 
Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and 
Opportunity7 calls the linear approach the ‘technocratic model’, and notes 
that “it is founded upon a classic view of discoverable and objective ‘facts’, 
which are socially and politically neutral, and the belief that all relevant 
facts can be revealed by science”. Once the nature of a problem has been 
characterized by science, responsibility moves to policymakers to address 
it in the best interests of society.
 Roger Pielke Jnr, in his book The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science 
in Policy and Politics8, draws an analogy with decision-making over an 
approaching tornado (‘tornado politics’). Even in the presence of irreducible 
uncertainty about the level of risk (‘Is it really approaching?’ ‘Will it really hit 
us?’ ‘How damaging will it be?’), there is sufficient unity of purpose that 
action (taking cover in the basement) follows with little delay or disagreement. 
Under such circumstances of broad consensus on a common goal (‘save 
ourselves’), with low cost (‘run downstairs’) and no practical obstacles (‘there 
is room for all of us’), the linear model functions well.
 However, in circumstances where interests, values and beliefs strongly 
differ, resulting in there being no agreement on a common goal, or when 
costs are high, or the practicalities problematical, the linear model fails.  
This is especially the case if the science (and hence level of risk) is 
uncertain, or when the science has no traction on the root causes of 
the different policy positions in play. Pielke offers an analogy of ‘abortion 
politics’, in which deeply held and opposed views rooted in ideology, 
religion, morals or ethics can be informed but not resolved by scienceiv. 
Dan Sarewitz9, 10 points out that under such circumstances, if the linear 
model is applied, “more research and more facts often make the conflict 
worse by providing support to competing sides in the debate, and by 
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iv  In his book The Climate Fix, Pielke refers to the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ – the false impression 
that you can obtain an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ (p197).
distracting decision-makers and the public from the underlying, political 
[ideological, religious, moral, ethical] disagreement”.
 Since all participants have accepted the ground rule that science is 
the arbiter that can and will determine the policy decision, the scientific 
evidence becomes the primary focus of dispute. Under pressure to 
prevail, the rules of rational discourse – which pursue ‘objective truth’ 
using an established process of inquiry, logic and validation based on 
impartiality and balanced evaluation of all the evidence – are susceptible 
to being abandoned by some protagonists in favour of the rules of political 
street-fighting, in which opinion, rhetoric, appeals to emotion, character 
assassination, cherry-picking and the distortion or misrepresentation 
of evidence are regarded as ‘fair game’. Under such circumstances, 
those who abide by the rules of science find themselves at a substantial 
disadvantage, especially if the distinction is not apparent to the audience. 
We will refer to this as ‘debate asymmetry’ and return to it later.
 Human-induced climate change exhibits characteristics that make it 
arguably the poster child of ‘abortion politics’. It has been described as 
a problem “almost perfectly designed to test the limits of any modern 
society’s capacity for response”11. Despite this, the linear model remains 
ubiquitous. It forms the approach taken by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), charged with advising policymakers “on the 
state of climate science, the implications and the policy options”v. Although 
policymakers vet and agree the scope of the reports and their content prior 
to publication, the core material – consisting of a comprehensive review 
and synthesis of thousands of scientific publications – is produced by the 
science community based on its own perception of what is important12. 
The ‘evidence’ so produced is then used to inform the related but separate 
international negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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v  IPCC Working Group I evaluates the scientific evidence for human-induced climate change, 
its nature and its likely future trajectory of the climate system; Working Group II then identifies 
and evaluates the implications; and Working Group III follows up with policy options.
 A myriad of other examples exists, ranging from the participation of  
the climate science community in the international conference Avoiding 
Dangerous Climate Change13, commissioned by the UK Government  
and hosted at the UK Meteorological Office in 2005 with the objective  
of “identifying what level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is  
self-evidently too much”, to the philosophy underlying the US Global 
Change Research Programme14. It is also deeply engrained in the origins  
of the new initiative Future Earth, being developed by the International 
Council of Science as a 21st century follow-on to its previous Global 
Change programmes. Despite repeated references in its descriptive 
material to “co-production with society”15,16, climate scientists have  
defined the programme and its research agenda (a list of priorities is 
provided); policy (and outreach) are then assumed to follow, albeit with 
consultation. At the time of writing, the Science Committee has already 
been appointed, whilst an Engagement Committee is still to be established. 
This deep-rooted technocratic mindset is encouraged and reinforced by the 
exhortation to researchers in 2011 by the Belmont Forum17, a coalition of 
the major environmental research funding agencies from around the world 
(and a major influence on Future Earth), to “develop and deliver knowledge 
in support of national and international government action to mitigate and 
adapt to global and regional environmental change”.
 We will consider below possible sources of reluctance or difficulty in 
abandoning the linear model. But we note that the insights of Sarewitz, 
Hulme, Pielke and others indicate that the linear model not only represents 
an inappropriate means of making progress to address the risk of climate 
change, but that by adopting science as the arbiter of policy it ensures 
the inevitability of the types of attack which climate science and climate 
scientists are currently experiencing.
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1.2  The ‘Co-Production’ Model
 The persistence of the linear model is all the more surprising in the light of a 
considerable body of work in science and technology studies that exposes 
its limitations, and the early recognition within the academic community that 
climate policy would necessarily have to defer to other priorities. In 1991, 
Bill Mitchell, a physicist and one-time Chairman of the UK Science and 
Engineering Research Council concluded in a paper entitled Reflections on 
Global Climate Change18.
  “Given the objective of improving the standard of living of 
currently 50% of the world’s population, over whatever period, 
the concentration of greenhouse gases will certainly increase, and 
will certainly not decrease. It follows that research priorities have 
to reflect living with a probable increase in global warming. This 
means developing new agricultures, using unused land, and, even, 
encouraging means of population migration.”
 At about the same time, social scientists Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz 
published their concept of ‘post-normal science’19, 20. They argued that the 
call for science to “remedy the pathologies of the global industrial system” 
necessitated new styles of activity “replacing the reductionist, analytical 
world-view by a systematic, synthetic and humanistic approach, based 
on assumptions of unpredictability, incomplete control and a plurality of 
legitimate perspectives”. They went on to describe a methodology applicable 
when either or both of ‘systems uncertainties’ or ‘decision stakes’ are 
high, under which circumstances the traditional methodologies that they 
identify as core science, applied science and professional consultancy, are 
ineffective. They likened the practice to the workings of a democratic society, 
characterised by extensive participation and toleration of diversity.
 Hulme describes this as the ‘co-production model’ (or ‘Mode 2 science’21) 
in which the goals of policy and the means of achieving them emerge 
from an inclusive and iterative process taking into account both scientific 
and non-scientific considerations. He describes an approach that through 
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open consultation across society establishes the dimensions of risk that 
actually matter to people, followed by an assessment and explanation by 
experts of the risks of different degrees of climate change, and a stage in 
which policymakers and politicians are required to argue and negotiate in 
public about what level of risk is tolerable. Science is called upon to inform 
the discourse by answering to its best ability specific, positive questions. 
Through this process, in which the influences of power politics and 
subjective biases of all participants – including the scientists22 – should be 
exposed, evidence-based and well-considered policy emerges with  
the understanding, if not support, of all involved. He notes that the  
co-production model is sympathetic to framing knowledge in terms of risk, 
adopting a Bayesian approach where appropriate, in which uncertainties 
are inherent and visible.
 A real-life example is provided by the Swedish government’s initiative 
to select the sites of permanent storage repositories for nuclear waste, 
in which a nationwide search and competition was established for 
communities that would be willing to host a site investigation and potentially 
the repository itself23. Within the UK public enquiries and citizen’s juries, 
as well as the activities of congregational bodies such as local councils, 
residents associations, churches, unions of all types and movements  
such as the “Transition Towns Movement ”, provide a basis upon which  
co-production could be built and expanded.
 Importantly, the co-production framework integrates scientists and their 
work into the decision-making process in a manner which is collaborative 
and constructive, and where responsibility, authority and accountability  
for policy lie transparently where they should: with the policymakers  
and politicians.
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1.3  Roles of a Climate scientist
 What are the functions that climate scientists can fulfill within the  
co-production model? How do these relate to their established norms and 
practices? Pielke explores the former question in his books The Honest 
Broker8 and The Climate Fix: What Scientists and Politicians Won’t Tell You 
about Global Warming24. He identifies four idealised roles for scientists, as 
set out below.
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Pielke’s four idealized roles
The ‘Pure Scientist’ focuses solely on generating ‘facts’ and delivering them to 
the ‘pool of human knowledge’, with no consideration for their use or utility, and 
no direct connection with decision-makers, who are left to find out for themselves 
what they need to know.
The ‘Science Arbiter’ seeks to stay removed from explicit considerations of 
policy and politics but answers factual questions posed by a decision-maker. A 
key characteristic is to avoid normative questions, which cannot be resolved by 
scientific enquiry, and focus on positive questions, which can (at least in principle).
The ‘Issue Advocate’ engages with a decision-maker seeking to reduce the 
scope of choice available by promoting a particular course of action that they 
justify using their expert knowledge and understanding.
The ‘Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives’ (commonly shortened to ‘Honest 
Broker’) engages in decision-making, contributing knowledge and understanding 
alongside a range of other participants to expand and clarify the scope of choice 
available, and to converge collectively on an agreed way forward.
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 Whilst noting that the Honest Broker is the most useful for policy 
development, Pielke proposes that all four of his idealised roles have their 
place, and that climate scientists have the choice of which one to play 
and under what circumstances. He emphasises the critical importance 
of making the role clear to all concerned once a choice has been made. 
We observe that it is not necessary, or even desirable, for every climate 
scientist to fulfil every role, but the community as a whole needs to 
establish a division of labour that satisfies societal needs.
 Pielke also points out the danger within any of the four roles of ‘stealth’ 
issue advocacy – when a researcher either knowingly or unwittingly 
advances a political outcome when apparently focusing solely on science. 
We discuss later how this might be guarded against.
 Considering each role in turn we make the following observations:
 The Pure Scientist is the role of greatest interest to the majority of 
researchers. It is usually what attracted them into a research career  
in the first place. It fulfils their job satisfaction (primarily curiosity about  
some aspect of the natural or social world), defines their self-image and  
self-esteem, and provides the means to gain esteem from the members 
of an invisible college of their peers. Given the pressures of fundraising, 
the tortuous and uncertain nature of scientific investigation (usually these 
days requiring organizationally complex and demanding collaborations), 
the requirement to maintain a flow of high-quality publications, to maintain 
skills at the frontier of their specialism and to keep up with an ever-growing 
volume of relevant published material, as well as the additional demands 
of teaching, supporting peer-review, and participation in a multitude of 
committees and panels, many researchers consider this to be the limit of 
their capability and obligation.
 The Science Arbiter role is problematical within climate science, since 
individual practitioners are generally expert only in a narrow specialism. 
So vast is the range of research topics encompassed and relevant to key 
conclusions that few, if any, are sufficiently well-versed and authoritative to 
be able to respond to the full range of general questions. This is reinforced 
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by the academic taboo of straying outside one’s direct area of research 
expertise. As a result, the Science Arbiter function is commonly performed 
by a committee or panel composed of an appropriate range of experts, 
backed up by access to a wider diaspora of specialists. Examples include 
the UK Committee on Climate Change25, and the ‘synthesis’ projects of the 
international Global Change research programmes26, 27.
 Within the climate science community there is a small but prominent group 
of individuals (James Hansen for example28, 29) who have adopted the mantle 
of Issue Advocate using their status as scientists, or invoking their specialist 
expertise, to justify and pursue a specific cause. In doing so they court a 
loss of authority and trust as their audience consciously or unconsciously 
makes judgements about their impartiality, freedom from bias, and motives, 
and discounts their commentary accordingly. Most natural scientists are 
instinctively reluctant to adopt the role, recognising the risk to their scientific 
standing. This is despite their right as citizens to express an opinion, 
provided they acknowledge that they are doing so, and provided they make 
clear the limits of the knowledge upon which the opinion is based, and the 
inevitability of personal bias. Some argue that a climate scientist’s specialist 
knowledge and perspective, acquired at the taxpayer’s expense, constitutes 
an obligation both to draw attention to issues they judge society needs to 
be aware of – as an opportunity or threat – and to offer their personal view 
on the most appropriate response30, 31. We will return to this issue in Section 
4.2, especially regarding the legitimacy and efficacy of scientists publicly 
expressing judgements.
 The Honest Broker function draws a parallel to that employed routinely 
in organizational decision-making. A standard approach involves a 
sequence of steps: defining the issue, identifying the options, identifying 
the evaluation criteria, describing each option, comparing and scoring 
the options, identifying the discriminators and summarising the trade-offs. 
For the decision-makers to be confident in the choice made, they need 
to be convinced that all possible options have been explored, and that 
the analysis has been thorough, fair and balanced. The process can be 
straightforward – even mechanistic – when addressing ‘tornado politics’; 
it is more challenging when confronting ‘abortion politics’, when interests, 
values or beliefs distort the discussion or are a source of conflict and 
disagreement. Under these circumstances the role of the decision-making 
body is to make a judgement, recognising that it may be impossible 
to satisfy all participants or to deliver a perfect outcome, and noting 
that pressures of political expediency may seek to prevail. Openness, 
transparency and fairness then become critical factors in the public 
acceptability of the decision. Citizens’ juries provide an example32.
 Given that the Honest Broker role is a crucial element of the co-production 
model, it would be reassuring to find it a commonplace activity for climate 
scientists, and one in which they have built of a corpus of experience 
and agreement on best practice. Although there are notable examples, 
such as the US Global Change Research Program’s National Climate 
Assessment exercise33 and US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s Regional Integrated Sciences & Assessments program34, 
a co-production approach with the characteristics described by Hulme, 
in which climate scientists participate with other stakeholders as Honest 
Brokers, remains the exception rather than the rule. It could be argued 
that the Chief Scientific Advisors (CSAs) and science support staff within 
UK Government departments play a version of this role. However, whilst 
the existence of the CSAs represents an important recognition of the value 
of expert scientific advice at the core of government, their contributions 
to decision-making and policy formulation, and the fora within which they 
operate, are necessarily neither transparent nor inclusive. In practice, the 
influence of the CSAs and the efforts by climate scientists to work with 
stakeholders to help them interpret the results of climate research (e.g. in 
the exploitation of the UK Climate Projections 200935, 36) correspond to an 
enhancement of what is at root the linear approach. The relatively limited 
adoption of the Honest Broker role thus appears to derive at least as much 
from of a lack of opportunity, given established, non-co-productive ways 
in which public policy is actually addressed, as it does from a general 
preference amongst climate scientists to focus on their Pure Scientist task.
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1.4 thoughts and observations on the Pielke Roles
 Kevin Curry and Susan Clark37, in a review of Pielke’s book, applaud the 
helpful framework it provides, but express disappointment that the Honest 
Broker role is not developed more fully. They regret the absence of specific 
examples, especially those demonstrating superior decision-making. Sheila 
Jasanoff38 points out that a study of the performance of senior science 
advisors reveals that they are prone to making value judgements within 
the decision-making process, and that these have a critical influence on 
the choice of facts and disciplines judged to be relevant, on when new 
knowledge is reliable enough for use, on which dissenting viewpoints 
deserve to be heard, and on when action is appropriate. This reinforces 
Pielke’s concerns about ‘stealth advocacy’, and the difficulty, or even 
impossibility, in practice in fulfilling the idealized Honest Broker role (see 
also Sarewitz23). To expose and counter such tendencies places a premium 
on process, and raises fundamental and challenging issues of governance: 
Who has legitimate authority to decide what on behalf of whom and on 
what basis? These questions lie beyond the scope of this document, but 
are of significant consideration for policymakers and the public.
 Here we draw attention to an omission from Pielke’s idealized functions 
– a fifth idealized role – that of engaging with society to draw attention to 
and discuss the results and implications of the research that it has funded. 
We adopt the title ‘Science Communicator’, and note that it includes the 
task of raising the alert if the implications of a piece of research point to 
a significant societal threat or opportunity. The view that scientists have 
a basic responsibility to communicate what they are doing, why they 
are doing it, and what results they have obtained is a basic tenet of the 
Science & Society movement that has developed over recent decades. 
It is enshrined, for example, in the Research Councils UK Concordat for 
Engaging the Public with Research39. In the case of policy-relevant research, 
particularly if it has been declared as such as part of the justification for 
funding, our view is that the communication and explanation of results 
is not an optional role: it should be an obligation. Climate science is 
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sufficiently technical and nuanced that it does not readily explain itself, and 
Sarewitz23 points out that when scientific results bear on policy decisions, 
scientists are embroiled in the policy process whether they like it or not, 
and carry authority and responsibility in “advocating one fact-based 
interpretation over another”.
 To do so represents a challenge, since most scientists are practised at 
communicating complex material to other experts using technical language 
and an ‘objective–method–results–conclusions’ format. They assume 
extensive contextual knowledge, a familiarity with the technical language 
and mode of discourse, and tend to stick rigorously to professional 
norms concerning the need to express uncertainties, to avoid presenting 
material outside their immediate area of expertise, and to avoid expressing 
judgments or opinions. Few are practised at translating their message 
into language suitable to inform a panel of experts in other fields, or in the 
day-to-day language and a storyline targeted at a general audience, let 
alone the concise form suitable for a journalist. We discuss this further in 
Section 4.2. Even fewer are confident or capable of participating in the 
rough and tumble of live public debate, where the rules of engagement 
may be far from academic (the debate asymmetry referred to earlier). Those 
who do so court loss of public and professional esteem if preceived to lose 
the argument, and can find themselves the target of vituperative personal 
attack. Not surprisingly, the majority prefer not to take the risk.
 Regarding the current norms and practices of climate scientists, we echo 
Pielke’s observation that “with some notable exceptions, most scientists, 
including social scientists, are simply unaware of the understandings of the 
scholarly community who study science in society”8. The body of salient 
knowledge and insight is, by and large, neither taught nor discussed. As 
a result, confusion tends to reign over the roles of climate scientists in 
decision-making, and such interactions as do take place are developed 
mainly on an individual basis and through trial and error – providing further 
evidence that Lubchenco’s “vigorous exploration of the relationship 
between science and society” is very much unfinished business.
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1.5  Why Does the ‘Technocratic’/‘Linear’  
model Persist?
 We have seen that despite its failings, and despite some encouraging 
examples to the contrary, the technocratic model continues to prevail. 
This may simply result from inertia following its success as the modus 
operandum during the Second World War (a textbook case of ‘tornado 
politics’) combined with a lack of recognition on the part of climate 
scientists that their circumstances differ (i.e. that climate science issues 
correspond to ‘abortion politics’). It is compounded by the general paucity 
of interactions between climate scientists and political scientists with 
expertise concerning the interplay between science and policy.
 But are there deeper reasons? One possibility is that for most Pure 
Scientists the policy relevance of a piece of science is perceived as a 
downstream output – almost an afterthought (or even a chore40). This 
may in turn derive from a tendency of the human mind to interpret the 
world in terms of linear ‘cause and effect’ and to seek simplistic solutions 
to complex problems. This was the view of Jay Forrester, who in the late 
1950s advanced the idea that our thought processes are ill-adapted to 
addressing the behaviour of complex, multi-loop feedback systems41, to 
which the co-production model more closely corresponds.
 A less flattering explanation is offered by Richard Lindzen42, who 
suggests that the self-interest of scientists, university administrations and 
government bureaucracies, combined with the pursuit by advocates of 
a political agenda, and the desire of politicians to avoid responsibility for 
hard and potentially unpopular decisions, leads to a situation in which all 
conspire to promote science as a source of political authority rather than 
a mode of academic enquiry (i.e. the technocratic model). He describes a 
triangle of interactions (the ‘Iron Triangle’) between politicians, scientists and 
agenda-driven advocates, in which politicians benefit by procrastination 
(waiting for research outcomes and greater certainty) whilst appearing to 
take action (commissioning the research), scientists benefit from the funds 
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(the ‘Iron Rice Bowl’), attention and prestige, and the advocates benefit 
from the production by the scientists of a never-ending source of new 
material (work in progress) which can be cherry-picked and exploited to 
suit their ends. Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen interprets the course of climate 
science, climate policy and energy policy within the UK in the decades of 
the 1970s and 1980s according to this prescription43.
 Although these may be harsh characterizations, they contain some elements 
not easily dismissed. There is no doubt that the policy relevance of their 
subject matter has increased the climate science community’s funding, 
standing and access to power and influence. And whilst the community 
has been active in drawing attention to the flaws in the arguments put 
forward by those that reject or downplay climate change (e.g. via websites 
such as Skeptical Science44 and RealClimate45), it has been less evident 
in denouncing alarmist misrepresentation of climate science. This might 
suggest a tendency, conscious or not, to sustain the political imperative. In 
this vein, Sarewitz asserts that errors in the IPCC reports have consistently 
been in the direction of greater threat46. However, this may reflect a bias in 
the process by which the errors have been exposed – by the dismissive 
community – rather than in their actual nature. Kenyn Brysse et al47 and 
Stefan Rhamstorf et al48 make the opposite case: that the climate science 
community tends to “err on the side of least drama”. 
 Whatever the underlying motivations, the interaction between scientists, 
advocates and policymakers in practice has served to reinforce the linear 
approach, to the detriment of science, public policy and decision-making. 
To move to the co-production model, in which scientists take their place 
with other experts to inform decisions by those assigned by society 
with the authority, responsibility and accountability to do so, will require 
determined changes in their mode of engagement by all parties.
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1.6  summary
 In this section we have explored the relationship of climate science to 
policy and the corresponding roles of climate scientists. We have identified 
a mismatch between established practices of climate scientists and the 
needs of the ‘new era’ of policy relevance, and an unhelpful disconnect 
between climate scientists and academics who study how science and 
policy interact. Notwithstanding examples to the contrary, we have drawn 
attention to the general persistence of the technocratic (linear) model of 
policy formulation, despite its inappropriateness, and despite the existence 
of a putatively more effective, although less well-tested, alternative (the  
co-production model). We have offered possible explanations for this. 
We have identified a fifth role of Science Communicator for scientists, in 
addition to those identified and described by Pielke. We have noted that an 
inevitable consequence of the linear approach is that climate science and 
climate scientists find themselves the target of unremitting controversy and 
attack. A key underlying source of this tension is disagreement over the 
policy options. A salient question, then, is how and why such disagreement 
arises in the first place. This we will address. However, it is useful first to 
explore the workings of the human mind, since this casts valuable light 
both on vulnerabilities of the scientific process, and on the societal reaction 
to complex, unwelcome and inconvenient scientific messages such as 
those delivered by climate science.
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 Chapter 2
whAt iS iNSide ouR miNdS?
KeY PoiNtS
   Rather than perceiving ‘objective truth’, our brains assign 
‘meaning in context’ to information gathered from our senses – 
constrained by prior experiences, and social and cultural factors.
   Many commonly held preconceptions about how the human 
mind works are incorrect or incomplete.
   These include assumptions about perception, cognition, 
rationality, our attitudes to others, values, as well as reactions  
to fear, risk and uncertainty.
   Human cognition consists of two types of thinking: intuitive 
processes and reflective reasoning. Both operate together, 
but more of our responses are determined by intuitions than 
commonly appreciated: intuitions come first, reasoning second. 
More goes on in our minds than we are consciously aware of.
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KeY PoiNtS CoNtiNued
  Disagreement within climate discourse has more to do with 
differences in values and world-views, and by our propensity 
for social evaluations than it is about scientific facts. This in turn 
leads to disagreements over policy choices. 
  Climate science contains enough complexity and ambiguity to 
support a variety of positions. Simply providing more facts will 
not resolve the disagreements.
  Findings from the social and behavioural sciences explain 
how people, given identical evidence, can come to opposing 
conclusions. They also provide an explanation for people’s 
natural inclination to denigrate those who hold opposing 
convictions. Taken together these insights help to explain the 
contested nature of climate science.
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2.1   insights from the mind sciences: Relevance to 
Climate Change
 In Chapter 1 we concluded that the functions of climate scientists are to 
reveal ‘objective truth’, achievable within certain limits, and to interact with 
society to stimulate and inform a rational co-produced public process 
determining how best to respond to the results and implications. The 
reliability of the scientific ‘facts’ and the trustworthiness of climate scientists 
were taken as given. Yet, in reality, how people communicate and perceive 
scientific findings, and how climate scientists are regarded by their 
audiences, are influenced by prior knowledge, opinions, habits, values and 
world-views49.
People across the spectrum of opinion on climate change share the same 
propensity to find reason to discount those with whom they disagree. 
Explanations range from ‘ignorance’ and ‘gullibility’ to ‘craziness’, ‘political 
motivation’ and greed for ‘power / influence / funds’. This tendency 
derives from what social psychologist Fritz Heider called common-sense 
psychology50: our minds automatically attribute intentions and character 
traits to explain the actions and opinions of others, and we construct – 
often speculative – narratives to make sense of their behaviour.
So what can a scientific study of minds and belief-formation add to those 
common-sense explanations we naturally generate? How can it help to 
communicate climate science better, and how can this knowledge defuse 
tensions in the ongoing public debate about climate policy?
In the following paragraphs we discuss research from neuroscience and 
psychology that illuminates these questions in two ways. Firstly, we explore 
the results of research into the communication of contentious issues. These 
provide a portal into what Dan Kahan calls an “evidence-based science of 
climate science communication”51. Secondly, we explore the motivations 
and psychological processes that lead people to take a strong public 
stand on a given issue, and hence result in divisions in society. These 
understandings open up ways to move the public discourse away from 
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the sterile stereotypical clichés that are currently so prevalent (‘alarmists’, 
‘deniers’, ‘evil vested interests’) to a conversation which is more respectful 
and constructive. On this topic, too, the report can only provide a portal, 
but references to further reading materials are supplied throughout the text.
The sections in this chapter are organized around common preconceptions 
about the human mind, which follow from our tendency to engage in 
common-sense psychology, or from dominant historical narratives about 
human rationality. We describe how these preconceptions have been 
subjected to experimental study, and how they are currently understood 
within different traditions in the mind sciences. Sometimes the results 
from these empirical studies have confirmed the original preconception. 
More often than not, however, they have demonstrated the need for 
alternative ways to think about the underlying issues. To give an example: 
several studies have shown that there is almost no relation between 
intelligence (as measured by IQ or verbal ability tests) and an individual’s 
propensity to consider arguments that contradict prior beliefs. Yet, these 
same experiments also showed that there is a strong relation between 
intelligence and the ability to defend one’s own point of view. In other 
words, intelligence or analytical ability does not protect from the risk of 
so-called ‘myside bias’, defined as the propensity to only see one’s own 
side of an argument52. These findings run counter to an intuitive explanation 
that people of any disposition may be tempted to employ (e.g. ‘people who 
disagree with me must be irrational or unintelligent’). Instead, they call for 
a richer set of explanations for why equally intelligent and well-meaning 
people, evaluating the same facts, come to opposing convictions. Such 
explanations start with how our brains impose meaning on the sensory 
stimulation coming from the world around us.
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2.2  Perception: ‘Meaning in Context’
“The observer never sees the pure phenomenon with his own eyes; rather 
much depends on his mood, the state of his senses, the light, the air ... and 
a thousand other circumstances,” wrote Goethe in Empirical Observation 
and Science53. Yet the common assumption was then, and often still is, 
that the senses represent the world truthfully, with some minor ‘noise’ 
introduced by the circumstances of the observer.
Preconception 1: the senses provide an accurate view  
of the world 
The view from perceptual neuroscience and psychology:
• The brain assigns meaning to sensory stimuli in a context of prior knowledge.  
• Prior knowledge incorporates evolutionary and developmental elements.
•  Perception is also influenced by factors such as mood, emotions,  
and social context.
Despite our daily experience to the contrary, our sensory systems are 
incapable of truthfully representing reality. The information the eyes provide 
to the brain is, by itself, insufficient to resolve the true state of the world. For 
example, light is captured in a way that conflates aspects of reality such as 
the illumination and reflectance of surfaces, which cannot be separated by 
further stages of sensory processing.
How then are we able to generate perceptions that appear to be confirmed 
by successful interactions with the physical world? We do so by applying 
prior knowledge in order to select which one of the possibilities is the most 
likely given the current stimulus. This prior knowledge derives from our 
lives’ histories, from brain development and learning, and from evolutionary 
history – the way natural selection has shaped the sensory processing 
systems in the brain. The selection pressures on these sensory systems 
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have not favoured an unbiased search for the truth. Rather, our brains 
use their history of perception to infer solutions that have proven to be, on 
average, the most likely to benefit us and to keep us alive.
We might assume that what is useful in keeping us alive cannot be that 
different from what is ‘out there’. That this is not necessarily true can 
be seen in Figure 1. Two physically identical patches look quite different 
depending on their spatial context. Rather than seeing a ‘true’ colour, the 
brain infers the colour based on the brightness and hue of the surrounding 
surfaces. Knowing that the patches are identical cannot override the 
powerful perception that they appear to be different54. The evolutionary 
benefit of perceiving intrinsic colour is fundamental to survival (for example 
in distinguishing between a venomous and a harmless reptile observed 
under various lighting conditions.)
Figure 1: The central tiles in the upper and front surface of the cube appear very different 
in colour (brown and orange), but they are physically the same. Knowing that this is true 
cannot override the perception.
(by R. Beau Lotto)
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Needs, goals, motives, and our physical and emotional state also affect 
basic perceptual judgements. For example, desired objects appear closer 
than undesired ones55, and children from poor socio-economic backgrounds 
estimate the size of coins to be larger than wealthier children56. These 
illustrations, and many more in the study of perception, demonstrate that 
our sensory systems do not attempt to provide an accurate view of reality. 
Rather, our brains assign meaning to sensory stimuli, constrained by context 
that derives from our immediate physical and mental state, developmental 
history, social and cultural environment, and the evolutionary history of our 
species (Figure 2). This process of assigning ‘meaning in context’ starts 
with the most fundamental building blocks of perception, but extends to all 
other aspects of brain operation. Most of the time our brains assign meaning 
automatically and quickly, as we will discuss next.
Figure 2: Factors that contribute to mental states, beliefs, thoughts and actions (adapted 
from Burton57)
Evolutionary history /  




emotions and mood Actions
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2.3  Cognition: intuitions and Reasoning
Even if sensory perception cannot provide an accurate view of reality, one 
might argue that human reason is, or ought, to be unaffected. This is one 
of the assumptions of the ‘rationalist’ tradition which has its roots in the 
enlightenment thinking of the 17th and 18th century: that through reason 
we can eliminate error and arrive logically at truth. The ideas of rationalism 
contributed to the scientific and industrial progress of the last 200 years, 
but its influence in society extends further, to the degree that a language 
of rationality permeates the public discourse on climate change. Many 
commentators have claimed the rational high ground, from Al Gore’s The 
Assault on Reason58 to Nigel Lawson’s An Appeal to Reason: A Cool Look 
at Global Warming59. However, the relationship between rationality and 
higher cognition – i.e. the way we use knowledge to make decisions, 
solve problems or come to new insightsvi – is much more subtle than the 
rationalist tradition assumes.
Preconception 2: Higher cognition is conscious and rational
The view from cognitive neuroscience and psychology:
•  Higher cognition involves two types of thinking: intuitive processes and 
reflective reasoning.
•  Neither is altogether rational or irrational, though both contain strong 
elements of rationality.
•  More of our responses are generated by intuitions than commonly 
appreciated: intuitions come first, reasoning second60.
vi   Examples of higher cognition are: solving a crossword or mathematical puzzle, making 
sense of the intentions of other people, or thinking about the morally right course of action 
to take in a given situation.
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One of the converging findings across a range of research traditions in 
neuroscience and psychology61–66 is that higher cognition involves two 
qualitatively different types of thinking processes:
•  System 1 intuitive processes are autonomous and effortless. They operate 
outside of conscious awareness and do not require controlled attention. 
They generate fast, automatic responses that are advantageous in 
specific situations. They are also the wellspring for spontaneous creative 
thoughts and ideas.
•  System 2 reflective reasoning is conscious, deliberative, effortful and 
requires controlled attention. It is flexible and can be applied to different 
problem domains. It underlies our capacity for abstract thinking, mental 
simulation and introspection.
System 1 consists of a multitude of processes that operate mostly 
non-consciously. We have little access through introspection to how 
a particular automatic response or intuition arose (though we can 
reflect on the response itself and consider its validity). Like the low-level 
perception processes described in Section 2.2, System 1 processes 
have been shaped by their utility for survival. They are mentally efficient 
and ecologically rational; that is, in the context in which they evolved, the 
responses are, on average, advantageous to survival. Because of their 
adaptation to specific contexts, the responses of System 1 are often biased 
towards certain outcomes, favouring one set of responses over others. 
In his book Thinking Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman describes them as 
“a system for jumping to conclusions”. They work well “if the conclusion 
jumped to is likely to be correct, and the costs of an occasional mistake 
acceptable, and if the jump saves time and effort”. But they are risky “when 
the situation is unfamiliar, the stakes are high, and there is no time to collect 
more information”62.
System 2 appears to be a single system. It is slow in comparison with 
System 1, and requires access to limited cognitive resources. For this 
and other reasons, System 2 reasoning is limited in its ability to override 
System 1 intuitions. It would therefore be incorrect to equate System 2 with 
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rationality: in many circumstances it is used to rationalise intuitions rather 
than to analyse them in a rational manner. In his book The Righteous Mind: 
Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, Jonathan Haidt uses 
the metaphor of an elephant (intuitions) and a rider (reasoning), where the 
rider has evolved to serve the elephant, and has only limited control over its 
direction60.
All thinking involves a combination of intuitive and reflective cognition, 
rather than cognition derived solely from System 1 or 2. We quickly see a 
solution to a problem, have an intuition that a proposition is true or false, 
or decide that someone can be trusted or not. This initial intuition may be 
accompanied by a search for explicit reasons to support or override it. 
The recognition that our thinking is dominated by autonomous processes 
that may or may not bear deliberative review is an important part to 
understanding our reactions to climate change. These insights apply as 
much to lay responses to the science and policy options, and to their 
judgements about the trustworthiness of scientists, as they do to scientists’ 
own framing of the science and participation in the public debate. We will 
return to this on numerous occasions below.
Preconception 3: Cognition is separable from emotion
The view from cognitive, affective and social neuroscience/psychology:
• Emotions are essential for cognitive decision-making in everyday life.
•  Cognition itself has an emotional component: intuitions have an associated 
feeling of rightness.
A further assumption of the rationalist tradition is that reasoning is (or ought 
to be) independent of emotion. Affect, however, is an essential ingredient of 
cognition. People who suffer damage to certain frontal brain areas maintain 
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their ability to solve analytical problems, but become poor decision-makers 
in normal life. They lack an affective signal that drives a preference for some 
choices over others. Based on reason alone, they can no longer come 
to a decision, even for simple questions such as when to schedule an 
appointment67.
Cognition itself has an affective component. In other words, there is a 
‘feeling of knowing’. Studies have shown that the act of retrieving a memory 
or seeing an intuitive solution to an analytical problem is accompanied by 
a ‘feeling of rightness’. The feeling may derive from how fast the memory 
or intuition comes to mind, or from a person’s beliefs about his/her skills 
in solving the task68. This feeling of rightness may interfere with people’s 
natural inclination to follow up an intuitive response with an effortful, 
reasoned analysis69.
Opinions and beliefs can also have an affective dimension. Psychologists 
make a distinction between any proposition deemed ‘true’ or ‘real’ (an 
opinion), and those that have an affective, evaluative component (an attitude). 
For example, ‘climate is the long-term average of weather’ is an opinion 
which implies emotional neutrality; ‘climate change requires urgent action’ is 
an attitude which may carry negative affect (it may trigger worry in some, and 
angry rejection in others). Being challenged about the attitudes that one finds 
important will feel distressing, regardless of where one lies on the spectrum of 
views about climate change. This idea forms part of the theories of cognitive 
dissonance and motivated reasoning, to which we turn next.
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2.4  the Formation and strengthening of attitudes
Preconception 4: opinions and attitudes are formed by 
rationally judging evidence
The view from cognitive and social neuroscience/psychology:
•  We readily accept evidence that fits with prior beliefs, but critically examine 
disconfirming evidence.
• Self-justification of our actions can drive people to a position of polarization.
•  A challenge to our attitudes (a threat to our self image) triggers the need for  
self-justification.
•  By being aware of this process we can deal more constructively with  
challenging situations.
We discussed previously how the brain assigns meaning to sensory stimuli 
in the context of prior knowledge, and how this affects the perception 
of even simple features such as colour, size and similarity. This ‘meaning 
in context’ principle is also applicable to cognitive information. Prior 
knowledge biases the assimilation of new information. People with strong 
convictions about an issue readily accept evidence that fits with their prior 
beliefs, but subject disconfirming evidence to critical examination70, 71. As 
social psychologist Thomas Gilovich wrote “for agreeable propositions, 
it is as if we ask ourselves: ‘Can I believe this?’ For disagreeable ones, 
it is as if we ask: ‘Must I believe this?’”72. These distortions have serious 
consequences for the communication of climate science (and science 
more generally). When examined through the lenses of biased assimilation, 
climate science contains enough complexity and ambiguity to support 
a variety of positions, from overly alarmist to entirely dismissive. Simply 
providing more facts will not be enough to resolve the disagreements. Much 
depends on the social and value-based context in which the information is 
presented and processed, as we will see later.
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Public attitudes about climate change have not always been so polarized. 
Crucial to understanding how they became so is the notion that, under 
certain conditions, behaviour drives attitude change. When there is a 
discrepancy between someone’s actions and internal attitudes, this gives 
rise to a process of self-justification to bring the internal attitudes in line 
with the outcome of the behaviour (Haidt’s rider justifying the actions 
of the elephant). Over time, this cumulative effect can lead from initial 
indifference to a position of strong conviction and polarization. In their 
book Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, 
Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts social psychologists Carol Tavris and Elliot 
Aronson compared this process of strengthening attitudes to a descent 
down the slopes of a pyramid (see Figure 3)73. A step off the tip of pyramid 
even if entirely unconscious amounts to an action (e.g. internalising some 
information or engaging in a conversation). Initially, the attitudes may be 
sufficiently weak that the direction of the initial step is random and even 
reversible. However, once that step has been taken it sets in motion a 
cycle of self-justification and further action. Each downwards step makes 
the continuation more likely. The further the descent the greater the 
commitment to a given stance, and the harder it becomes to retrace steps 
or to contemplate being wrong.
Figure 3: The ‘pyramid’ of increasingly stronger conviction and polarization
further apart
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What drives people to the bottom of the pyramid? A key insight is that 
people strive towards internalvii consistency74, particularly in the beliefs 
they have about themselves75 (e.g. ‘I am an intelligent, kind and competent 
person’). A challenge to our behaviour or attitudes acts as a potential threat 
to our self image (‘How could I, an intelligent, kind and competent person, 
hold an illogical belief or have done something hurtful?’). It gives rise to 
‘dissonance’, a state of discomfort and distress, which acts as a powerful 
motivating force to rationalize the offending evidence. It is thus because of 
the desire to be right in our beliefs about ourselves (and its opposite, the 
discomfort we want to eradicate when those beliefs are challenged), which 
puts us at risk of descending to the bottom of the pyramid. What counts as 
a threat depends on the circumstances of each individual, but, interestingly, 
the people at greater risk of becoming polarized over climate change are 
those who perceive themselves as intelligent and scientifically literate. The 
consequences of this were demonstrated by Kahan and colleagues76, who 
showed that higher scientific literacy and numeracy resulted in greater 
(not smaller) division between different cultural groups assessing the risk 
associated with climate change. As we reported in Section 2.1, intelligence 
may help to support one’s own point of view, but in itself it does not guard 
against ‘myside bias’.
vii  The ‘internal’ distinction is important; what may appear inconsistent or conflicted to an 
external observer may be perceived as consistent to the individual themselves.
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2.5  seeing others
In the previous section we treated the formation of beliefs as occurring 
in isolation, but in reality we are strongly influenced by the attitudes of 
the people around us and the information they provide. Thus we can 
experience conflicting demands between our personal attitudes and those 
held by the individuals and groups we identify with. Crucial questions are 
‘Who do we trust?’ and ‘Who has authority to speak?’. The motivation 
to arrive at conclusions that are in line with a peer group is strong, but 
people are constrained in doing so by their ability to construct reasonable 
justifications for their conclusions77. This means that they may disagree 
with their peer group on some issues, and that even those who are very 
entrenched may sometimes change their minds if they no longer find 
‘reasonable justification’ to support their position.
Two social strategies that people employ to justify their beliefs are to find 
support among like-minded people and to denigrate those with other 
convictions. Such motivations are evident in the – often very unconstrained 
– climate science discourse (supportive or dismissive) that takes place 
within the blogosphere and on Twitter. In this section we will discuss some 
of the mechanisms that contribute to the social attributions that, in the 
context of climate change, all too often lead to denigration. In the following 
section we will encounter some of the consequences of the second social 
strategy: finding support among like-minded people.
Preconception 5: We judge those we disagree with by the 
same standards as ourselves
The view from social and evolutionary neuroscience/psychology:
• We tend to explain our own actions more positively than those of other people.
•  We use intuitive cognitive processes to judge the trustworthiness of people we 
engage with.
•  Such processes are negatively biased in situations where we are not directly 
interacting with others.
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In his book The Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character, 
and Achivement, journalist and commentator David Brooks condensed 70 
years of social attribution research into one sentence: “We judge ourselves 
by our intentions, our friends by their behaviour, and our enemies by their 
mistakes”78. This fundamental asymmetry is hard to avoid. It has led social 
psychologists to identify a number of self-biases in which we explain 
ourselves more positively than others. One such bias, the fundamental 
error of attribution79, states that we tend to explain our own behaviour with 
recourse to external, contextual factors, whereas we are more likely to 
explain others in terms of fixed character traits.
Like general cognition, social cognition (i.e. thinking about the intentions 
and mental states of others) is more a product of intuitive, automatic 
cognition than we generally appreciate. It starts with infants as young as 
three to six months of age: they overwhelmingly prefer ‘nice’ over ‘nasty’ 
characters in simple puppet shows80, 81. As adults, our minds have sensitive 
mechanisms to detect when we are at risk of being cheated in situations of 
conditional social exchange (e.g. ‘If you accept a specific benefit, you must 
fulfil an associated requirement’)82. Such a social contract exists between 
academic scientists and the taxpayer: ‘If you accept public funding for your 
research, I expect you to behave in a competent, trustworthy and open 
manner’. These conditions make us highly sensitive to signs of improper 
behaviour, and it should come as no surprise that media stories alleging 
incompetence or dubious behaviour are readily believed by people who 
have no evidence to the contrary.
When combined with our own intuitive feeling-of-rightness and our view 
of ourselves as good, kind and competent, the common-sense way to 
explain those we disagree with is as ‘ignorant’, ‘unintelligent’, ‘gullible’, 
‘mad’ or ‘evil’, when in reality their beliefs will to them seem equally rational 
and virtuous. Many people take deeply to heart these explanations, which 
originate in their intuitive social cognition. They see them as the core 
explanation for their disagreements with others, increasing their own feeling 
of ‘being right’. For people who have reached the bottom of the ‘pyramid’ 
(Section 2.4), the climate debate is thus more about social facts than 
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about scientific facts. And over time, these social explanations lead to the 
stereotypes discussed previously.
The best antidote to these negative sides of our social intuitions is face-to-face 
personable interaction, under conditions of mutual respect, humility and 
empathy. Only those conditions will allow mending of relationships and more 
accurate judgements of the good intentions and trustworthiness of others.
2.6  Values, Cultures and World-Views
Preconception 6: the public debate about climate change  
is a debate about scientific facts
The view from social, moral and cultural neuroscience/psychology:
• Underneath the disagreement about facts lies a disagreement about values.
•  The combination of climate science communication with value-driven policy 
proposals has led to a cultural polarization over climate science.
The societal division over climate change started from differences in 
values and moral intuitions generated by the suggested solutions for and 
policy implications of climate change. Solutions for climate change have 
often been framed in terms of ‘saving the environment’ and ‘saving the 
planet’. Whilst care for environment and planet are ethical concerns that 
can become concrete to some people, the association between rather 
abstract concepts like ‘planet’ and ‘environment’ and the ethical concern 
of ‘care’ is a learned association (i.e. a cultural value). It is not a universal 
ethical concern such as the feelings of care we may experience almost 
automatically when exposed to the suffering of individuals. Feelings of 
care follow from empathy – i.e. the capacity to feel what another person is 
feeling – which is another important aspect of our social brains83. Research 
has shown that even for people who make large lifestyle changes as a 
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consequence of their concerns about climate change, empathy for the 
plight of other people may be a larger motivating force than care for the 
environment84.
Solutions to combat climate change often appear to limit liberty (either 
of the market, or personal). Such proposals may clash with the values 
that some individuals hold important, and have contributed to the cultural 
polarization over climate change. Kahan and colleagues have conducted 
a number of studies that have shown these effects. For instance, 
cultural values and world-view (e.g. having an ‘individualist’ compared 
to an ‘egalitarian’ outlook) rather than scientific literacy, explain large 
disagreements in people’s perception of risk posed by climate change76 or 
their understanding of ‘scientific consensus’85. Conversely, changing the 
‘cultural meaning’ of climate science messages (for example by adding 
geo-engineering as a supplement to restricting CO2 emissions) helps to 
offset cultural polarization over climate science itself86.
As we noted in Section 2.5, the motivation to agree with the values of 
one’s peer group is strong, but limited by the ability to construct seemingly 
reasonable justifications for one’s position77. Therefore, rather than seeing 
these cultural values as absolute determinants, they can be seen as a biasing 
force. Specifically for climate change, the long-term framing of solutions that 
clashed with individual values made the initial step off the ‘pyramid’ (Section 
2.4) for some groups more likely to go one way than the other.
Climate science communicators should be aware of and take into account 
such psychological mechanisms and biasing cultural world-views. 
Communicators should try to be sensitive to the different cultural meanings 
that their messages may have for different audiences87. Importantly, 
however, this process should itself be evidence-based. As Kahan et al 
have argued88, collaboration between communicators and social scientists 
on evidence-based field experiments is the best means to improve the 
communication of climate science.
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2.7  the Consequences of Fear appeals
Preconception 7: Fear appeals are effective in the context  
of climate change
The view from health, social and evolutionary psychology:
•  Fear appeals are effective when they point to specific dangers and are 
accompanied by solutions.
• In other conditions, they are likely to lead to avoidance and desensitization.
•  Alarmist messages that fail to materialize contribute to the loss of trust in the 
science community.
Reports about climate change often focus on its potentially dire 
consequences – sometimes more so than is justified by the science. This 
may follow from the private concerns of the communicators, and from the 
preconception that communicating threatening information is a necessary 
and effective catalyst for individual behaviour change. But there is little 
concrete evidence for this. Threats and the fear they induce do act as a 
motivator for action, but only if specific rather than vague, and specific to 
the individual rather than impersonalviii. Also important is the availability of 
clear and specific information on how to avert the danger. Individuals need 
to have a sense of control, and feel that the proposed strategy is an effective 
way of resolving the problem89, 90. These conditions are almost all violated 
in the context of climate change91: threats are usually imprecise and far in 
the future; proposed solutions may seem costly and unattractive (e.g. large 
lifestyle changes) or too small to have an impact (e.g. changing types of light 
bulbs). In this context, it is possible for individuals to change their behaviour 
once they become convinced of the severity of the issue, but only as a 
viii  This has been shown by research in different areas, mostly in the communication  
of health issues.
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determined and conscious decision, usually driven by a set of internalised 
values (see Section 2.6), rather than as an intuitive response to avoid danger.
Fear appeals relating to climate change are not only poor catalysts 
for behaviour change, but also have harmful consequences. Strong 
fear appeals with low efficacy to avert danger can generate defensive 
avoidance (‘This is too scary to think about’) or reactance (‘They are trying 
to manipulate me’)90. When they are initially accepted, they can generate 
a state of prolonged worry and anxiety. Over time this worry changes to 
numbness, desensitisation and disengagement from the issue altogether.
Alarmist messages have also played a direct role in the loss of trust in the 
science community. The failure of specific predictions of climate change 
to materialize creates the impression that the climate science community 
as a whole resorts to raising false alarms. When apparent failures are not 
adequately explained, future threats become less believable92, 93. Moreover, 
it is likely that they put our sensitive cheater detection mechanisms (see 
Section 2.5) on high alert and make allegations of personal gain more 
believable. Media reports that suggest incompetence (e.g. the focus on 
errors in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report) or improper behaviour (e.g. 
‘Climategate’) then resonate more strongly with parts of the public because 
they turn the question ‘Must I believe this threatening information that fails 
to materialise?’ into ‘Can I believe that the communicator is trying to scare 
me for his/her own personal gain?’ The attraction of the second question 
is understandable for those who do not know anyone personally within the 
climate science community, or who do not have access to other information 
that allows them to establish the trustworthiness of the communicators.
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2.8   Risk and Uncertainty: Scientific versus  
intuitive notions
Preconception 8: Risk and uncertainty are unambiguous  
concepts
The view from cognitive, social and evolutionary neuroscience/psychology:
•  The scientific notions of risk and uncertainty are likely to differ significantly from 
intuitive notions.
•  People may judge risks differently, dependent on emotional, social and cultural 
factors.
The concepts of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ permeate the climate change 
discourse. Scientists have endeavoured to define formally what they mean 
by the terms, and to quantify and communicate them clearly94. However, 
uncertainty (as a scientific concept) and risk analysis (e.g. as used by 
insurance companies) are products of our System 2 cognition. They 
represent sets of analytical rules and procedures developed to aid  
decision-making in an unpredictable world. Over years of professional 
experience, scientists and risk analysts have internalised these practices 
and come to associate them closely with the meaning of the words. 
Outside of this context, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ generate intuitive responses 
that differ from their analytical counterparts.
Risk perception as automatic System 1 process has both a cognitive and 
affective component. Experiments have shown that humans can quickly 
and reliably detect when the violation of a precautionary rule leads to a 
situation of danger (‘When you drive, you should wear a seat belt’)82.  
The adaptive advantages for such intuitive risk perception mechanisms  
are similar to those for cheater detection in social exchanges (see 
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Section 2.5)ix. Risk also carries affect, as expressed in the idea of ‘risk 
as feelings’95, 96. Negative affect, such as fear, amplifies risk judgements; 
positive affect and anger both attenuate risk judgements97. How much risk 
individuals perceive depends on the contextual factors shown in Figure 2: 
personality, mood, values and world-views all have an impact, as has been 
well established in the context of climate change76, 98.
Unlike risk, there is no known equivalent System 1 cognitive process for 
the perception of uncertainty. Rather, uncertainty is thought to be a mental 
and affective state characterised by ‘not-knowing’, by a lack of the feeling 
of rightness discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Little is known about the 
cognitive aspects of uncertainty. What is important to note here is that for 
those who have not internalised the formal, scientific notion, it is natural 
to substitute it with something we all have experience of: i.e. the feeling of 
uncertainty. The language of uncertainty can thus have different effects on 
different audiences. Those who are motivated to dismiss the science read it 
as fundamental doubt (‘Scientists don’t know anything’); activists may react 
to it angrily (‘Why are they speaking about uncertainty when my feeling of 
certainty tells me we need to take action?’); and decision-makers may react 
with frustration (‘Please resolve the uncertainty so we can take decisions’).
This distinction between lay and expert perceptions of risk and uncertainty 
does not imply an inability to understand these concepts in the same way. 
Rather, it is crucial for the scientific community to understand that the way 
they have internalised their System 2 processes in their own conceptions 
of risk and uncertainty cannot readily be carried across to non-specialists 
by mathematical definitions. Because we have System 1 intuitive processes 
for the perception of risk (‘risk as feeling’) the formal concept of risk 
(‘risk as analysis’) is probably most easily translated to people’s intuitive 
understanding – with the proviso that the level of risk different people will 
perceive in the same situation will be coloured by their emotional state, 
ix  The System 1 processes for detecting the violation of precautionary and social exchange 
rules are likely to be distinct, as selective brain damage may lead to impairment in one 
domain but not the other.
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cultural values and world-views. We will return to the preference for the 
language of risk over uncertainty in Section 3.10.
2.9 discussion and summary
In this section we have explored the workings of the human mind and 
identified some implications for the communication of climate science. 
Scientists are trained to investigate aspects of the world around them. 
Some do so through the application of pure thought, whilst others use 
instruments to observe or measure, or computer models to simulate, 
explain and predict. In each case, a crucial skill is the knowledge and 
understanding of the ‘tool’ they employ sufficient to distinguish ‘truth’ from 
‘error’, manifested, for example, as flawed versus correct logic, signal from 
noise, or spurious artefact from genuine result. So it is ironic that so few 
natural scientists are knowledgeable about the workings – and limitations – 
of the most basic tool they deploy: their mind.
We have seen in this section that many common preconceptions about 
the workings of the mind are misleading or incomplete. Psychologist 
Steven Pinker, commenting on the work of Kahneman, observed: “Human 
reason left to its own devices is apt to engage in a number of fallacies 
and systematic errors”99. Scientific researchers need to be acutely aware 
of this, recognising the implications it has for their ability to achieve the 
logical correctness, impartiality, open-mindedness and balance which they 
seek. Humility and constant introspection (‘seeing yourself see’), driven by 
awareness of the issues, can provide a partial safeguard. As Pinker also 
noted: “If we want to make better decisions in our personal lives and as 
a society, we ought to be aware of these biases and seek workarounds. 
… We have the means to overcome some of our limitations, through 
education, through institutions, through enlightenment”.
In practice, it is the organised scrutiny within the scientific process that 
exposes the inevitable flaws and errors of scientists’ work. We discuss this 
further in Section 3.5. At least within science, that process, imperfect as it 
may be, provides a methodology, as well as an aspiration and commitment, 
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to weed out error and converge on ‘objective truth’. Contributions to 
the discourse that are not subjected to an equivalent process should be 
weighed accordingly.
To many scientists, the recognition that their mind focuses on generating 
meaning in context rather than an ever-more truthful image of reality can 
be a revelation. But once this is recognized, along with the other insights 
discussed in this section, many features of the lay reaction to the results 
and conclusions of climate science can be understood. This is especially 
so once the roles of the emotional response to distressing news (fear, guilt, 
despair), the reaction against a threat to deeply held values of ideologies 
(e.g. a belief in individualism, and a related antagonism towards regulation 
and state intervention) are taken into account100. The messages from 
climate science are far from neutral in these respects, and so while some 
individuals may be galvanized into action, others experience a backlash of 
defensive avoidance or rejection, enhanced by the powerful need to feel 
right not wrong (and hence to rehearse and perfect arguments that justify 
this), and the tendency when stressed to seek someone to blame. For a 
climate scientist to connect with an audience, their approach needs to take 
these realities into account. We will return to this in Chapter 4.
Firstly though, we investigate the real-world performance of scientists and 
discuss how it contrasts with widely held mythology. We then consider how 
lessons from the world of business, notably the concept of ‘brand DNA’, 
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KeY PoiNtS
   Whilst scientists are highly trusted, they are held to overly 
idealised and unrealistic expectations of behaviour.
   The climate science community is very broad and lacks a 
coherent unified voice.
   Climate science is complex, and its conclusions are unwelcome, 
inconvenient and contested. It cannot be easily rendered into 
simple truths.
   The concept of ‘brand DnA’ provides a helpful means of 
identifying ways to strengthen the coherency and credibility of 
climate science.
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KeY PoiNtS CoNtiNued
  The internet offers opportunities for greater transparency and 
public participation in climate science. The quality and value of 
the discourse already under way within the blogosphere would 
benefit from greater participation of scientific experts.
  One way for climate scientists to engage more with society and 
with policymakers is to encourage and inform discourse on 
tractable, ‘no or low regret’ ways forward addressing different 
benefits on different timescales, starting with the near term.
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3.1  scientists: myth and Reality
Opinion polls reveal very high levels of trust in scientists. In the UK around 
70% of people believe that scientists tell the truth, as opposed to fewer 
than 10% who do not101, 102. Since few members of the public have ever 
met a scientist103, what is the mental image that results in such high regard? 
What are people’s expectations?
Robert Merton, the pioneer of the sociology of science, characterized 
the scientific ethos as a set of cultural values and norms which scientists 
internalize and use to guide their thoughts and actions104. He summarized 
these as Communalism, Universalism, Disinterestedness and Organised 
Scepticismx. A substantial literature has explored and expounded upon 
these ideas, often challenging the degree to which they reflect reality. For 
example, Michael Mahoney105 extended Merton’s concepts, identifying six 
characteristics commonly attributed to scientists both by themselves and 
by the lay public:
• objectivity and emotional neutrality
• rationality – as evidenced by superior reasoning skills
•  open-mindedness – as evidenced by suspension of judgement and 
willingness to change opinion
• superior intelligence
• integrity in data collection and reporting
• communality – through open and cooperative sharing of knowledge.
x  Communalism equates to the common ownership of discoveries by which scientists 
relinquish intellectual property in exchange for recognition and esteem. Universalism 
holds that claims to truth are evaluated in terms of universal or impersonal criteria. 
Disinterestedness is defined in terms of a passion for knowledge and a selfless concern for 
the benefit of society. ‘Organised scepticism’ requires that all ideas and results are tested 
via a rigorous, structured community scrutiny.
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Considering objectivity first, Mahoney cites a number of historical instances 
in which scientists’ perceptions have been influenced by their expectations. 
One example is the illusory perception of canals on Mars, which arose as 
a result of optical flaws in early telescopes, but persisted long after these 
had been overcome. He suggests that such confirmation biases may be 
common “particularly when there is a clear expectation, ambiguity in the 
data, and a heavy reliance on the human as an instrument of observation”. 
Biases creep into experimental design, constituting a form of motivated 
reasoning. He points out: “Like other humans, scientists tend to associate 
with other people who share their views”, leaving them vulnerable to 
‘group-think’ and paradigm lock-in, as we saw in Section 2.5, and as 
discussed in depth by Thomas Kuhn106.
On emotional neutrality, Mahoney notes that scientists are seldom impassive 
in their reactions to their work, and that: “The thrill of discoveries, positive 
results and personal success is thus accompanied by the (occasional) agony 
and frustration of anomalies, negative results and personal failures.” Since 
cognition cannot be separated from emotion (Section 2.3), it follows that 
scientists’ thinking is vulnerable to emotional influences. Indeed, a strong 
emotional drive may be essential for scientific creativity and progress107.
But a lack of emotional neutrality on the part of individual scientists does 
not invalidate science. Karl Popper observed that: “It is not the objectivity 
or detachment of the individual scientist, but of science itself (what may be 
called ‘the friendly-hostile cooperation of scientists’ – that is, their readiness 
for mutual criticism) which makes for objectivity”108. We will discuss this 
further in Section 3.5.
For each of the other five characteristics, Mahoney concludes that under 
scrutiny “the image has not fared well”. Pursuing the point, Joseph Ben-
David109 notes that when embroiled in controversies, scientists commonly 
abandon some or all of their ethical norms, for example acting with passion 
to further their goals, withholding findings in order to prevent advantage 
from competitors, and behaving “like litigants concerned more with putting 
together a convincing case than with the ultimate truth”. Mike Mulkay 
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concluded that Merton’s norms should be seen less as a description of 
science practice, and more as “vocabularies of justification”110, 111.
Given these realities, it is perhaps surprising that the myth of rational, 
impartial and emotionless purity retains such a firm hold on the self-image 
of the science community, and on the view from the outside by a generally 
admiring public. The high cultural ideals and norms of science represent a 
state of perfection constantly striven for, but hard to achieve. This follows 
directly from the insights of Chapter 2, and it underscores the need for 
active critical reflection and humility (‘How do I know? Could I be wrong?’) 
by scientists – and equally by those who accept, and those who dismiss, 
their results. Public confidence and trust could be enhanced by making 
such ‘active critical reflection’ transparent and open.
A strong public backlash is to be expected if a mismatch is exposed 
between expectations and reality. A salutary example is provided by the 
public dismay and loss of confidence following the release in 2009 of emails 
from the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit, which cast the 
behaviours of leading climate scientists in a poor light (‘Climategate’)112–118. 
We will return to this, noting here that it demonstrates the risk to the 
reputation of climate science and the regard for climate scientists not 
only of questionable practice, but also of allowing an overly idealised and 
unrealistic expectation to take hold and endure.
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3.2  What Can We Learn from Branding?
We have seen that public regard for climate scientists is strongly influenced 
by how they are observed to behave. It is also affected by what they say. 
The situation is analogous to that of the public reputation and level of 
trust in a business or organization, which is often addressed in terms of a 
‘brand’. The practice of branding has become highly sophisticated, and 
here we explore what climate science might usefully learn from its insights, 
recognizing that a social-marketing approach to ‘selling’ climate science 
per se is inappropriate119.
A brand is a reputation: a public standing120–122. A brand concerns ‘affect’, 
corresponding to the thoughts and feelings generated automatically when 
people see or imagine these symbols. If there is a positive resonance, they 
trust the brand and accept its legitimacy and narrative. It is a way of telling 
a story: to unify, to stand out, to display an identity and self-image, and to 
connect. It is not a specific product, logotype or colour palette, however 
recognizable these may be.
Positive branding is not easy to achieve. A brand’s positive associations 
can all too easily and quickly be destroyed by a negative behaviour or 
association123. Creating a clear, unified and wholly positive brand, robust 
against events, is challenging; re-establishing one that has been damaged 
is especially so. A brand achieves success by creating a promise. This 
results in an expectation. When experience matches – or even exceeds – 
the expectation, the degree of trust in the brand grows; it is seen to deliver 
on its promises. By consistently doing so, trust develops into loyalty and 
then even advocacy. Once the latter is the case, the brand no longer has 
supporters, it has ‘disciples’ spreading the word and building its reputation 
for it. The reputation is no longer what the brand says it is: it is what people 
say it is.
Many successful brands have created their reputation by standing for 
something very clear – sometimes referred to as the ‘brand DNA’. They 
have built all aspects of their work around a singular understanding of 
their purpose (what they are for), their values (how they behave), their 
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vision (what they are seeking to achieve over a period of time) and their 
core narrative (what they communicate). Crucially, everybody within the 
brand has to be behind these elements, and needs to be committed and 
effective at delivering them. To help drive the brand’s reputation, every piece 
of communication that comes from it needs a coherence that creates an 
experience that is unified and consistent with expectations.
This is not to say that successful brands are robust against all eventualities. 
But when faced with a challenge they can defend themselves from a 
position of strength. They have confidence, because they know what they 
stand for and what they are seeking to achieve. They have the capacity to 
survive, and can even benefit from errors and misfortunes, because people 
judge brands on the way they handle a challenge, and are prepared to 
forgive the initial setback. Ultimately, brands create reputations by providing 
something people value, respect and regard. They make a difference, and 
by achieving this distinction, they prove their worth; they connect and build 
relationships.
In the following sections we use the insights from branding and the concept 
of ‘brand DNA’ to explore ways in which the public status and role of 
climate scientists can be strengthened.
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3.3  Who Speaks for Climate Science?
We have seen that a consistent and persistent ‘brand DNA’, encompassing 
purpose, behaviours and core narrative, is important to sustain a positive 
public standing. This is especially the case in a world where trust in  
once-respected institutions has been deeply eroded. But to do so for 
climate science presents a fundamental problem, since it is currently 
impossible to identify who is a climate scientist and who is not. Whilst 
there are an estimated 30,000 ‘climatologists’ worldwide, the vast 
range of science that contributes to the overall conclusions of climate 
science (ranging from studies of the Sun to the economic behaviour of 
humans) leaves it virtually impossible to isolate the subset of researchers 
corresponding to the expert climate science ‘community’ (see also the 
related discussion regarding the ‘Science Arbiter’ role in Section 1.3).
Add to this the blurring in the public square of pronouncements by 
environmental activists, politicians, advocates, pundits, commentators and 
self-appointed experts from all walks of life, all scrambled by distortions 
and errors in the media reporting, and it is apparent that the answer to 
the question ‘Who speaks for climate science?’ is ‘More or less anybody’. 
Without a coherent voice, maintaining a narrative that expresses consistent 
purpose, values and core messages is not possible. The resulting 
inconsistencies undermine the basis for a productive public conversation, 
and open up vulnerabilities to public confusion and mistrust.
Importantly, the same does not apply to those who dismiss the messages 
and policy implications of climate science, who, whilst drawn from a 
heterogeneous array of individuals and groups, are unified by a common 
purpose: to stand against a narrative with which they strongly disagree.  
As a result, regardless of any explicit coordination which may take place124, 
there is a natural tendency for their messages to converge on greater 
coherency.
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What could be done to balance this asymmetry? Official bodies such as the 
National Science Academies, scientific unions, the American and European 
Geophysical Unions, societies such as the UK Royal Meteorological 
Society, conferences and occasional gatherings of scientists such as 
the Nobel Laureates have all issued ‘authoritative’ statements on climate 
change (such as the most recent publication, by the UK Royal Society and 
US National Academy of Sciences125). However, whilst these broadly agree 
on their core scientific messages, they differ in detail, are generally poorly 
judged for a lay audience, and are only loosely adhered to by individual 
climate scientists. Neither the voices nor the messages are coherent, 
consistent or accessible to lay audiences.
One way to overcome this would be to create a body tasked explicitly with 
engaging in the public discourse – or conversation – on climate science 
(essentially the Science Communicator role proposed in Section 1.4). A 
longer-term initiative would be to establish a professional body for climate 
science that would accredit its members – allowing the voice of climate 
science to be clearly identified – and would provide a means and leadership 
for the community to develop a new set of cultural norms, values, practices 
and narratives, better attuned to the world in which climate science now 
finds itself. Importantly, it would seek to define and oversee standards of 
performance in the manner achieved by other professional bodies. We will 
return to these ideas in Chapter 6.
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3.4  elusive Consistency
Even assuming a unified and coherent voice for climate science can be 
achieved, we have seen the importance of consistency in the message 
delivered. However, a variety of factors militate against this ideal:
Academic freedom: Academics fiercely defend their intellectual 
independence, and resist committing to an ‘agreed’ set of standardized 
messages and goals. Those who do speak publicly reserve the right to 
present differences in content, emphasis and approach – including the 
extent to which they advocate policy and express alarm and urgency.
Narrow focus: As we have seen in earlier sections, scientists are generally 
motivated to focus their efforts on their (highly fragmented and individualistic) 
Pure Scientist role, and many do not recognize or acknowledge the broader 
obligations of policy-relevant science, including the need to actively deliver a 
unified and coherent ‘brand DNA’ and message.
The exaggeration of doubt: Naomi Oreskes and Robin Conway, in their 
book Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth 
on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming124, document how the 
tobacco industry, when faced with irrefutable evidence demonstrating the 
deadliness of its product, sought not to challenge the evidence directly, but 
to convince the public that the science was unsettled. An internal memo 
read: “Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with 
the ‘body of fact’ that exists in the mind of the general public.” They and 
others126–128 provide extensive evidence that the use of dismissal and  
doubt to sabotage climate science is now a routine part of US politics,  
well-funded by vested interests and delivered via a variety of think-tanks 
and activists. Riley Dunlap and Peter Jacques, based on a study of over 
100 climate-change-dismissive books, identify strong links to conservative 
think-tanks (although with evidence that the genre is becoming increasingly 
‘self-sustaining’) and note that fewer than 10% undergo peer review, 
“allowing authors or editors to recycle scientifically unfounded claims that are 
then amplified by the conservative movement, media and political elites”129. 
Doubt in the public mind is also created by the intense focus of the media 
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and dismissive voices on any errors in climate science documents. The 
result is to discredit the science overall and hence undermine confidence 
(e.g. media coverage130, right wing blogs131 and an alternative assessment132 
of the relatively few and easily corrected errors in the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report).
False balance: This concerns the confusion created in the public mind 
by media reporting in which a compulsion to tell ‘both sides’ of the story, 
combined with time pressure and lack of expert depth on the part of the 
journalist, results in the distinction between assertions and scientific ‘facts’ 
not being made clear, or when disagreement over unresolved scientific 
issues (‘work in progress’) gives the impression that well-established 
conclusions are also in doubt. Within the UK, sceptical voices were present 
in roughly one in five articles covering climate change in a three-month 
study period in 2009/10133. In a report prepared for the BBC Trust, Steve 
Jones concluded that the corporation was giving undue space to climate 
dismissive voices “to make statements not supported by the facts”134. BBC 
coverage of climate science in spring 2014 triggered similar complaints135. 
The impression of uncertainty generated in this way contrasts sharply with 
the widely expressed conclusion within the climate science community that 
human influence on the climate system is clear136, 137.
Problematic consensus: It is known that people exposed to apparent 
disunity amongst scientists on global warming tend to feel less certain that 
it is occurring, and show less support for climate policy138. To counter this, a 
number of attempts have been made by scientists to demonstrate high levels 
of professional agreement – for example showing that 97% or more of the 
expert community are in accord on the core outcomes139–141. Unfortunately, 
seeking to convince in this way suffers a weakness – that scientific facts 
gain their legitimacy not from consensus, but by surviving the process of 
organized scrutiny (discussed below). The argument that the ‘consensus’ 
is not the result of a ‘vote’, but represents the aggregate of independent 
conclusions by thousands of experts, is open to question, since it assumes 
that each scientist has carried out ‘due diligence’ to evaluate critically the 
evidence upon which their position is based. To do so involves rigorous 
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scrutiny of a host of results ranging outside their individual zones of expertise. 
In all likelihood, the majority of researchers simply trust the effectiveness of 
the scientific process, and within it, the professionalism, honesty and rigour 
of colleagues working in areas outside their direct expertise. This places a 
premium on the effectiveness of the science process in producing robust 
outcomes, which we consider shortly.
Alarmism: Climate change is often presented in the public discourse in 
apocalyptic terms142,143. This is in part due to the tendency of the media 
to seek a striking headline, partly due to genuinely concerned individuals 
expressing their fears, and partly a deliberate strategy by some to engage 
public interest. It also arises as a result of the difficulty scientists experience  
in delivering messages that are alarming without slipping into ‘alarmism’.  
Gill Ereaut and Nat Segnit note that the alarmist climate repertoire is typified 
by “an inflated or extreme lexicon, with an urgent tone. … It employs a  
quasi-religious register of doom, death, judgment, heaven, hell, using words 
such as ‘catastrophe’, ‘chaos’ and ‘havoc’”144. Saffron O’Neill and Sophie 
Nicholson-Cole conclude that although fear appeals have much potential 
for attracting people’s attention, they are generally an ineffective means of 
motivating genuine personal engagement145. This is consistent with Section 
2.7, in which the dangers and drawbacks relating to fear appeals were 
outlined. Unsurprisingly, the alarmist narrative has generated a powerful 
backlash, in which climate scientists, along with the media and lobbyists, 
are characterized as ‘doom mongers’ motivated by self-interest to feed false 
panic and mass hysteria146, 147. This contrasts strongly with the view noted in 
Section 1.5 that climate scientists have a tendency to “err on the side of  
least drama”.
Ereaut and Segnit conclude from their study of how climate change is being 
communicated and discussed in the UK that: 
     “The climate change discourse in the UK today looks confusing, 
contradictory and chaotic. For every argument or perspective, whether 
on the scale of the problem, its nature, seriousness, causation or 
reversibility, there is a voice declaring its opposite … It seems likely that the 
overarching message for the lay public is that in fact nobody really knows.”
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3.5  the Road to objective truth
The fundamental feature that distinguishes the outcomes of scientific 
enquiry from other explanations of the world around us – and especially 
from assertion, opinion and (ideological or other) beliefs – is the testing 
of the ideas and results through a process of rigorous, structured, 
community scrutiny (‘organised scepticism’). The process takes a number 
of forms: informal critical discussion amongst colleagues and experts via 
correspondence or in departmental seminars, brainstorming sessions or 
the coffee room; line-management oversight and challenge; the process 
of peer review of journal publications; and discussion and challenge within 
the worldwide cohort of experts – sometimes hostile – via correspondence, 
published criticisms, and face-to-face at seminars, workshops and 
conferences.
Considering each in turn: local scrutiny can be patchy due to limits on the 
availability of specialist expertise. In any case, there may be a reluctance to 
share ideas or results prior to publication for fear of alerting a competitor 
lest they publish first. Line-management oversight of research detail is 
generally weak. Journal peer review provides an important filter that limits 
the number of flawed ideas and results in circulation – at the expense of 
rejecting some valid work. However, shortcomings of the process have 
been the subject of much academic investigation and soul searching148–150, 
and have received heavy criticism in the blogosphere and elsewhere151.
In practice, it is the scrutiny of published results by scientists worldwide, 
and over a period of time, that allows the evolving balance of confirmatory 
and disconfirmatory evidence to be weighed, discussed and, ultimately, 
decided upon. By this means a subset of results reported in the academic 
journals migrate from being interesting possibilities to becoming established 
‘fact’ suitable for textbooks (noting that even long-established ‘facts’ are 
vulnerable to revision in the light of new evidence).
There is a general acceptance amongst scientists that, given ‘sufficient 
time’, despite its shortcomings and evident possibilities for improvement, 
Popper’s “friendly hostile co-operation and … readiness for mutual 
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criticism”108 provide a structured route for new material to come into play 
and progress to become part of the body of accepted knowledge, at 
the same time affording reasonable protection against error and fraud. 
Certainly, conjectures and results not subject to such a process should be 
discounted accordingly.
However, in circumstances where the need (or not) to change the existing 
world order of energy production, finance and politics hinges on the 
results of science, and where these results are (unsurprisingly and rightly) 
questioned and contested, it is worth considering whether the science 
review process, in all the forms identified above, would benefit from further 
strengthening.
This should certainly involve greater openness and transparency about 
the derivation of specific results (e.g. by making the relevant data sets and 
analysis available online with appropriate metadata and explanatory text – 
as is increasingly the case), and possibly greater institutional engagement 
and vigilance. But it could also involve developing means to discuss, 
evaluate and explain the status of a given result using open fora via the 
internet (possibly through a form of ‘Wiki’), formalizing the conversations 
carried out on existing blog sites of all persuasions, but mediated in a 
manner to maintain open-minded impartiality, rationality and critical thinking. 
The benefit would be the availability of a trusted and authoritative means 
to explore the basis upon which any given result has been derived, and 
to understand whether and why it remains ‘work in progress’ or has been 
superseded or vindicated. The cost would be the effort (and financial 
support) required to achieve this in a manner that was genuinely efficient, 
robust and trusted.
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3.6  mismatched Rhythms
We noted above the importance of allowing the peer review process to 
run its full course. But to what does ‘sufficient time’ correspond? It may 
only take a few minutes to spot an obvious flaw, yet, even with today’s 
accelerated pace of activity, it may be decades before a deeply entrenched 
but erroneous paradigm is exposed and shifted. The rate of progress is 
constrained by the often substantial time taken to achieve a next step in 
testing (it can take decades to design, build, launch and operate a satellite 
instrument, or to prepare an ocean-going scientific cruise, or to develop 
and run a new computer model), or by the need to wait for time-dependent 
processes within the climate system to run their course.
Herein lie problems. Firstly, the timetables of decision-making and policy 
formulation can be significantly out of synchronism with crucial scientific 
evidence upon which they depend152. Under some circumstances, a 
‘decision pathways’ approach may be possible, allowing decisions to be 
delayed as long as possible to take advantage of the best information 
available, and to allow for recovery if judgments subsequently prove 
wrong153, 154. In other cases, time pressure may force action regardless.
Secondly, timescales of months to years – or even decades – are 
incompatible with the ‘instant’ response times and attention cycles of the 
contemporary media, blogosphere and, frequently, policy formation. The 
intense emphasis on immediacy focuses public discussion on results or 
events too fresh for necessary critical assessment to have taken place. 
As a consequence, the lay public is exposed to an ongoing sequence of 
news stories that veer according to the latest turn of events, generating an 
impression of disorder and disarray. What is being witnessed in reality are 
glimpses into the process of scientific scrutiny – but this is rarely explained.
This lack of appreciation of the process of science provides advocates 
– including media outlets with strongly ideological or politicised editorial 
policies – the opportunity to cherry-pick results to suit a given agenda. 
Sequential cherry-picking can generate the appearance of a consistent 
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narrative, regardless of whether or not it is scientifically sound. Refutations 
or clarifications by the science community, if they take place at all, occur 
days if not months after the initial story, when public interest has moved on.
3.7  new Forms of scrutiny and Participation
The rise of the internet has introduced a further powerful dynamic. Anyone 
with access is free to participate in the scientific process. The reaction of 
the science community has been mixed. A small but growing number of 
pioneers has welcomed such interest (see for example Tamsin Edward’s 
blog All Models are Wrong155). Some researchers have taken the opportunity 
to ‘crowd source’ intellect, skills and effort to assist with experiments, 
distributed-computing exercises and data analyses, and to engage 
the lay public in collaborative initiatives with experts (e.g. Myles Allen’s 
climateprediction.net156 and the Climate Change Collaboratory157).
Others, though, have reacted less enthusiastically, especially to requests to 
scrutinize the workings behind published results. It was such reluctance, 
in the face of a barrage of Freedom of Information requests, perceived by 
the scientists involved as mischievous, that led to the ‘Climategate’ affair. 
Accounts of this and the associated ‘hockey stick controversy’113, 114 can 
make uncomfortable reading for those with high expectations for standards 
of scientific conduct.
The internet also provides a platform and ‘echo chamber’ for voices offering 
a potent mix of science, pseudo-science, misinformation, opinion and  
name-calling, all free of quality control or rigorous review, and unconstrained 
by normal courtesies. We will return to this issue later, noting in passing that 
the nature and implications of the internet as a platform for discourse are as 
yet poorly understood – despite some early investigations158.
Here we note that there are evidently many issues to address in ‘opening 
up’ the scientific process – not least the gulf between the knowledge and 
experience of experts and non-experts, and the time and effort required to 
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deal with this. Nevertheless, there is growing evidence that there is much 
to be gained from the increased transparency made possible by public 
involvement159 and from the increased division of investigative labour that 
such participation offers. The latter not only opens up the possibility of 
tapping into a vast resource of skills, viewpoints, experience and effort, 
but provides a means to develop the co-production approach to policy 
formulation discussed earlier.
3.8  Reluctant Cross-disciplinarity
Climate science is a supremely complex subject. It addresses a ‘wicked’ 
issue, which is intricately entwined within a host of other environmental 
and societal problems. Its task is to explore and understand the workings 
of a vast and complex co-evolved system, and the nature of that system’s 
response to a geologically rapid and significant human-induced shock. 
In doing so it transcends a multitude of traditional disciplines, ranging 
from atmospheric physics to psychology. Keeping up with the sheer 
flux of material in any one specialism is itself a challenge, but to arrive at 
climate science’s conclusions requires the assembly of myriad elements of 
disciplinary knowledge into a unified and accurate synthesis. The dual tasks 
of carrying out and synthesizing the science represent an enormous and 
demanding cross-disciplinary challenge.
It is well known that cross-disciplinarity is hard to achieve. Even overcoming the 
barriers between closely related subjects can be problematical. John Ziman, in 
a deeply insightful essay160, explored the underlying forces at play. He observed 
that specialization is a rational response to the norm of originality (“Caught 
between the totality of human knowledge and the immensity of human 
ignorance, what is one to do? The only practical policy is to specialize”). He 
conjectured that resistance to cross-disciplinarity has deep psychological and 
social roots, and has always been a dysfunctional feature of science, amplified 
by shortcomings of the academic rewards system. This is despite the evidence 
that “the most significant new ideas are usually combinations of old ones”161.
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Ziman observed: “The function of research management is to encourage 
and guide researchers to work voluntarily on desired problems”. This 
includes assembling the cross-disciplinary teams necessary to address 
complex, high-priority issues. It was this imperative, namely the need to 
agree priorities and set up internationally coordinated projects to execute 
and synthesise climate science, that led to the establishment in 1980s 
and 1990s of the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP)26, the 
International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP)27 and International 
Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP)162. Together these sought to 
encompass the Earth system as a whole. Figure 4, based on a schematic 
of climate-related Earth-system processes by Francis Bretherton163, 
illustrates the relationship between the three programmes.
Figure 4: The relationship of the three original international Global Change research 
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It was the same imperative that led to the establishment of a variety of 
real and virtual climate science institutes. Examples include the Potsdam 
Institute for Climate Change165 in Germany and the Tyndall Centre in the 
UK166. Other initiatives with the same objective include the restructuring of 
research programmes at research institutes such as the British Antarctic 
Survey167 and major international enterprises such as the International Polar 
Year 2007–2008168.
The need to break down disciplinary barriers remains an ongoing issue, 
as exemplified by the UCL Grand Challenges programme, of which the 
UCL Policy Commission on Communicating Climate Science forms a part. 
A further example is the restructuring of the international Global Change 
programmes (IGBP, IHDP and DIVERSITAS169) into Future Earth17.
3.9  The Perils of Over-Simplification
Albert Einstein observed that to tell a complex story it is necessary “to 
make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler”170. For reasons 
discussed in the previous section, the story of climate science is especially 
complex and challenging to express. The resulting temptation is to simplify. 
But to do so risks oversimplification and hence misunderstandings, 
misrepresentations and inconsistencies that, when revealed, threaten 
credibility and trust (and thus damage the ‘brand’).
As long ago as 1991, Bill Mitchell18 expressed worries on this account.  
As a physicist, he was especially critical of the use of ‘mean global surface 
temperature’ as a state variable of the climate system, pointing out that 
it is thermodynamically meaningless and provides no useful insight in the 
perception or evaluation of climate risk. To understand the energy flows 
and fluid dynamics of the system, or the implications of climate change for 
humans, it is the spatial and temporal variations in temperature (and other 
parameters) around the world that matter. This fundamental shortcoming 
has been compounded by the incorporation of mean surface temperature 
into the ‘climate sensitivity’, defined as the change in the equilibrium 
86     Strengthening the Public Standing of Climate Science
value of the temperature in response to a doubling of the atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2). Climate sensitivity is widely used 
as a representative metric when discussing the future path and societal 
risks of global warming. It is not difficult to see that a substantial increase 
in the temperature of one half the planet offset by an equal and opposite 
decrease in the other half could have a major impact on the behaviour of 
the climate system, and on the wellbeing of humanity, whilst corresponding 
to a value of climate sensitivity equal to zero. The wisdom of the use 
of either of these parameters in the public discourse is thus deeply 
questionable. Yet it is a limit on change in the mean surface temperature 
that has been adopted as the very foundation upon which the international 
negotiations to mitigate climate change are being carried out under the 
auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Other problematic oversimplifications abound. These include the framing 
of humanity’s impact on the atmosphere in terms of temperature change 
(a secondary issue) rather than as a planetary energy imbalance (the 
primary consequence), and the adoption of phrases such as ‘global 
warming’ (which routinely conflicts with direct experience) and ‘climate 
change’ (which does not distinguish between natural and human causes), 
rather than ‘climate disruption’ (which captures the potential risk of our 
perturbing the climate system out of the unusually stable Holocene state 
during which civilization arose, and upon which the design of modern world 
infrastructures is based).
Evidently there is a need to rework the climate science narrative – to 
provide a clear, coherent and accurate statement of what is known, what 
is suspected and what is not known, that is both sufficiently simple and 
relevant to be relevant to a range of audiences, including non-experts, 
and is consistent with, and robust against, unfolding reality (of the climate 
system) and events (new discoveries, challenges, shortcomings of process 
or people).
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3.10 Further issues of Uncertainty and Risk
We have already discussed differences between lay and expert perceptions 
of uncertainty and risk (Section 2.8). Here we note that a central tenet 
of experimental science, drummed into every young researcher, is that a 
measurement has no value without an estimate of its uncertainty. So strong 
is the imperative that it constitutes a central cultural norm. As a result, when 
presenting their results, scientists feel compelled constantly to emphasise 
the associated uncertainties.
This has an unfortunate consequence, since in addition to the psychological 
issues already discussed, science is widely understood by the lay public to 
consist of a body of hard-edged laws and facts. This expectation contrasts 
with the perspective of science held by its practitioners, whose interest 
and motivation is to explore the realm of the unknown and to extend the 
limits of knowledge, where uncertainties abound. A consequence of the 
mismatch is that an unrelenting emphasis on uncertainty is interpreted by 
non-scientists as revealing confusion – or at least as indicating that less is 
known about a given scientific issue than is actually the case. The effect is 
to reduce faith in science (‘Surely after all that effort and expenditure you 
could do better than that?’), to raise suspicions (‘Why aren’t you telling me 
what you really know?’) or to justify the postponement of difficult decisions 
(‘Let’s wait until the science is settled’).
A means of addressing these issues would be to adopt a ‘risk’ framing 
(once again noting issues raised in Section 2.8). Within business and 
organisational management the control of risk is routine and well 
understood. It forms the basis of prudent action: to increase resilience by 
lowering both the probability and impact of pertinent threats. A shift to a 
risk framing within climate science, whilst clearly acknowledging inherent 
and often irreducible uncertainties, would thus seem sensible.
Unfortunately, there are many examples of scientists reinforcing the status 
quo, not only through their reluctance to relax the norm, but by offering 
to ‘reduce uncertainties’, when in practice additional research often 
magnifies uncertainties by revealing greater complexity, and by failing to 
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stress sufficiently that within complex entities such as the climate system 
some uncertainties are irreducible. The situation is exacerbated by often 
incomplete, distorted or partial reporting of uncertainty in the media.
James Painter’s comprehensive review of the issue171 provides a detailed 
analysis of the representation of uncertainty and risk in recent media coverage 
of climate change. We defer to Painter’s helpful contribution, and will not delve 
into that aspect further here, other than to note his observation: “Many argue 
that when compared to the messages of disaster or uncertainty that often 
surround climate change, risk is far from being a panacea, but it does offer a 
more sophisticated and apposite language to have the discussion in, and a 
more helpful prism through which to analyse the challenge.”
3.11 All Models are Wrong But Some Can Be Useful
A central feature of climate change science is a heavy emphasis on 
prediction. Dan Sarewitz172 points out: “Scientists are attracted to the 
intellectual challenge of making predictions, and recognise that promising 
to provide predictions appeals to the interests of policy-makers who fund 
them.” He continues: “And decision-makers would prefer to hand over 
responsibility for the future to scientists – who would also take the blame 
when wrong.” (e.g. “We thought we were dealing with experts.”173 )
Sarewitz challenges the assumption that ever-improved predictions are a 
critical ingredient of wise decision-making, noting that “if wise decisions 
depended on accurate predictions, then in most areas of human endeavour 
(they) would be impossible”. He argues that earthquake science was 
fortunate because it was quickly evident that exact predictions were 
probably impossible. As a result, the focus of the interaction between 
science and policy has been to improve resilience, addressing building 
standards to minimise the risk of structures collapsing, and addressing 
emergency recovery plans in the event that they do.
In contrast, the origins of climate science from within the meteorological 
forecasting community have resulted in an implicit assumption that, with 
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a larger computer, more funding and a bit more time, prescriptive advice 
– and effective action – will follow. Sarewitz cautions that this is a flawed 
assumption, and uses the case of Hurricane Katrina to illustrate the point. 
Despite very accurate prediction, decades in advance, of the likelihood of 
such an event – and, over the preceding days, of the specific threat – the 
fate of New Orleans was sealed by “a lethal combination of socioeconomic 
and racial inequity, regional environmental degradation, unwise 
development patterns and engineering failure”. It was the prior policies and 
the levees that failed, not the predictions.
He concludes by recommending that “science should focus more on 
understanding the present and less on predicting the future”, pointing out 
that with policymakers confronted by the dilemma of having to commit 
to major expenditure up front for uncertain benefits in the future, climate 
science could help “by moving away from its obsession with predicting the 
long-term [presumably 2050–2100] future of the climate, to focus instead 
on the many opportunities for reducing present vulnerabilities to a broad 
range of today’s – and tomorrow’s – climate impacts. Such a change in 
focus would promise benefits to society in the short term and thus help 
transform climate politics”. In a similar vein, others suggest the pursuit 
of multiple ‘no or low’ regret initiatives aimed at delivering benefits over 
a range of near-to-medium term timescales, recognizing that this would 
not only break action deadlocks, but would benefit from the influence that 
behaviour has on attitudes (Section 2.4).
More generally, prediction is a risky business, since every failure, real 
or perceived, calls into question the credibility of the source. The UK 
Meteorological Office, despite generally high levels of public respect and 
trust174, has repeatedly suffered the consequences. Examples include 
pronounced criticism regarding the ‘Great Storm’ of 1987175, the ‘Barbecue 
Summer’ of 2009176 and the ‘Dry Winter’ of 2013/2014177. Pielke24 points 
out that, based on our long experience of weather forecasting successes 
and failures, we have all unconsciously developed an heuristic that we 
use to discount daily meteorological predictions. It would take thousands 
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of years to build up an equivalent level of experience to judge the skill of 
100-year climate forecasts. Coupled with a tendency to confuse weather 
events with climate, and the difficulty of envisioning the situation globally 
(as opposed to locally or regionally), our natural ability to assess climate 
predictions is limited. Pielke identifies five criteria that determine when 
decision-makers can rely on predictions. He observes that long-term 
climate predictions (or projections) fail with respect to each, whether 
expressed as certain forecasts or probabilistic scenarios. This raises 
concern at the prominence of such predictions in the climate dialogue,  
and about their central role in policy formulation.
Some related points are worth making. Firstly, a computer model is 
merely a tool, and the caveats that accompany its products need to be 
clearly stated and considered judiciously. The point is explored in detail by 
Lenny Smith and Arthur Petersen, who distinguish three kinds of reliability 
(statistical, methodological and public) and emphasise the need to consider 
each in the context of a given purpose178. They recommend that it is not 
sufficient to add a ‘health warning’ to climate predictions or projections, 
but that it is necessary to work closely with decision-makers to ensure that 
strengths and limitations within a given context are properly understood (i.e. 
the Honest Broker/co-production model of Section 1). They note: 
“Failing to highlight the shortcomings of the current science will not 
only lead to poor decision-making, but is likely to generate a new 
generation of insightful climate sceptics, rightly sceptical of oversell, 
of any over-interpretation of statistical evidence and of any unjustified 
faith in the relevance of model-based probabilities”.
Secondly, according to the rules of scientific logic, only unsuccessful 
predictions (disconfirmations) bear conclusive implications for scientific 
advance. This is ironic, since it is prediction failures that have been the 
target of scathing condemnation by climate change critics. Yet it is precisely 
those failures that reveal gaps in our understanding, and open up the 
possibility of new scientific advances.
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Thirdly, it is important to challenge the misconception that the case 
advanced for human-induced climate change pivots on the output of 
computer predictions, when in reality it is based on a pattern of results 
drawn from fundamental theory and observations, assisted by modelling.
Fourthly, there is a distinction between modelling to inform mitigation, and 
modelling to inform adaptation. The former addresses timescales of order 
a century and beyond, where uncertainties about societal driving forces 
can be dominant. Furthermore, since the primary driving force of change 
(greenhouse gas emissions) is irreversible and the consequences delayed 
by multiple decades, there is a premium on predictive accuracy. In the case 
of adaptation, however, timescales are shorter, and responses can benefit 
from adaptive flexibility. This is well illustrated by the Thames Estuary 2100 
plan drawn up by the UK Environment Agency to protect London from 
tidal flooding179. The ‘decision pathways’ approach adopted recognizes 
decisions will have to be made in the face of irreducible uncertainties about 
the detailed threat, even taking into account ongoing advances in predictive 
capability. To assure a given level of protection into the future whilst 
avoiding unnecessary expenditure, critical decision points are identified and 
options defined which allow subsequent flexibility should the predictions 
prove wrong153, 154.
Finally (as discussed in earlier sections), there is a compelling argument 
that, whilst from a scientific standpoint there remains much to explore, for 
the purposes of policy ‘we know enough’ about the general trajectory of 
climate change and the requirement for a response. A continued emphasis 
on prediction diverts attention from the much more important, difficult and 
politically unattractive task of evaluating and deciding upon policy options.
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3.12 Climate Science is Different
In this section we have explored a variety of issues that complicate the 
‘branding’ of climate science. We finish by drawing attention to four 
additional aspects of climate science that cause its communication to be 
especially challenging.
It is complex. The conclusion that climate change is real, driven by human 
actions and problematical derives from a pattern of evidence, not from a 
single ‘killer fact’. Describing the array of evidence takes time and effort, 
and is not conducive to a sound bite. In contrast, climate dismissive 
arguments can be seductively simple (‘It’s natural’, ‘It’s the Sun’, ‘Humans 
have always adapted’). Bryant Welch, in his book State of Confusion: 
Political Manipulation and the Assault on the American Mind, points out that 
when humans are perplexed or overwhelmed, they are strongly motivated 
to seek simple, clear solutions voiced by a perceived authority180.
Its conclusions are unwelcome. The implications of climate disruption 
generate strong emotional reactions. Some people are galvanized into 
action (supportive or dismissive – see Section 5.2), but for many the natural 
response is to avoid bad news either by negation (believing something 
untrue that is true) or defensive avoidance (unconsciously accepting that 
something is true, but finding ways systematically to refute or ignore it – 
for example, see Sally Weintrobe’s book Engaging with Climate Change 
– Psychoanalytic and Interdisciplinary Perspectives181 and the article by 
Ann Karpf182). Susanne Moser points out the numbing effect of climate 
science delivering a constant onslaught of bad news: “for most people it is 
challenging to keep listening to (such) depressing news. … The problem is 
too big, too complicated, too overwhelming – it’s hopeless”183.
Its conclusions are inconvenient. Climate science offers a stark message: 
that to avoid serious future risks, rapid transformative action is required to 
reconfigure the world’s energy generation system, the economic system and 
global political practices. Machiavelli’s insight applies: “There is nothing more 
difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its 
success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things”184.
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It is contested. A brief visit to a climate-dismissive blog site, or to comments 
posted on a climate-related media article in the right-wing media, will reveal 
the depth of antagonism that exists towards climate scientists, and the rich 
seam of dismissive arguments in play. Lacking a mechanism to eliminate 
misunderstandings, flaws and errors, the same arguments tend to be 
constantly recycled, even when discredited. A natural reaction of scientists, 
unused to dealing with raw personal attacks, or with having repeatedly to 
deconstruct and expose the same flawed material, is to disengage, leaving 
the climate-dismissive ‘echo chamber’ to build up its own alternative ‘reality’.
3.13 summary
We have identified a number of factors, some general and some specific, 
that place levels of public trust in climate science and climate scientists 
at risk. Regarding behaviours, we have identified issues of unrealistic 
expectations, misconceptions about the nature of science and the scientific 
process, shortcomings of the scientific process, a mismatch between the 
natural rhythms of science and those of the media and blogosphere, and 
a varied and uncertain reaction by scientists to the new realities of the 
internet and its transformative impact on the democratization of science 
and policy.
Regarding messaging, we have pointed out a tendency to make misleading 
oversimplifications, to emphasise uncertainty rather than risk, and to 
overemphasise the contribution of prediction. We have noted four aspects 
of climate science that make it especially challenging to communicate – 
that it is complex, unwelcome, inconvenient and contested. Arguably the 
most fundamental lack is that of a unified voice persistently delivering a 
‘meta-narrative’ which is accurate, engaging, coherent and relevant, and 
which – by making clear the limits of certainty and knowledge – is robust 
against new discoveries and unfolding events. We will consider how these 
issues might be addressed in Chapter 6. First we explore the power of 
storytelling in engaging and informing an audience.
Horseman by Dame Elizabeth Frink. Photograph Joe Low
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 Chapter 4
CAPtuRiNg AN  
eNgAged AudieNCe
KeY PoiNtS
   narrative offers a powerful means to engage an audience and 
convey complex concepts.
   When dealing with non-experts in climate science, scientists 
should adjust their approach accordingly, avoiding undue 
reliance on the information deficit approach, and overcome 
their reluctance to employ the elements of successful narrative 
including personalizing their story, drawing on emotions and 
expressing their opinions.
   Despite long-standing tradition and pressures to the contrary, 
dialogue rather than debate offers the means to identify common 
purpose and foster constructive, evidence-based discourse.
   Climate scientists can gain much by working with and learning 
from those expert in public discourse, including the arts, 
museum sector and media.
4.1 Telling Tales: The Compelling Power of Narratives 96
4.2 Science Communication Basics 100
4.3 Discourse not Debate 103
4.4 Summary 105
96     Capturing an Engaged Audience
4.1 telling tales: the Compelling Power of narratives
Human beings are profoundly social. Unlike large groups of animals, which 
merely aggregate together, human groups are structured by hierarchies of 
age, gender, class and status that require constant monitoring. Given that 
the addition of even one extra group member results in a nonlinear increase 
in the number of two-way relationships within the group, it is unsurprising 
that humans should have developed mechanisms that allow them to 
negotiate their social world. Indeed, some commentators have argued 
that it was precisely this computational pressure that drove the evolution 
of the human brain itself, which, like the average human group size, is 
proportionately larger than in any other primate species.
Figure 5a: Narrative Structure (after Greimas185)
Narrative is by far the most versatile cultural tool for modelling social 
relations. Many different definitions of narrative are available, but where they 
generally concur is in announcing narrative as representation of how agents 
–real or fictional – interact in time. Though seemingly unexceptionable, this 





Axis of desire: subject and object
Axis of alliance: helper and opponent
Axis of legitimacy: sender and receiver
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for characterising social life (see Figure 5a). In the first instance, narrative 
reflects the most common of all human experiences – that of lack. At its 
core, every narrative features an agent (a subject) who, consciously or 
unconsciously, desires something that they do not have (an object). To 
get this prized object, however, they must struggle – and this brings in the 
second important dimension of narrative. Though we are enmeshed in 
social relations of many types, they all, ultimately, reduce to relations that 
either help or hinder us. This is reflected in the struggles of the narrative’s 
protagonist, who enters into alliances with helpers and enmities with 
opponents that make the goal easier or harder to achieve. Finally, there is 
the question of legitimacy. It is not enough for a protagonist to seize the 
object of their desire; they must be justified in doing so. Thus, even when 
the protagonist operates at a material disadvantage, most narratives will 
still afford them moral superiority vis-à-vis an opponent. This is generally 
achieved by having a conferring authority (a sender) that dispatches the 
protagonist for the benefit of some greater purpose (the receiver). Narrative 
therefore offers a thumbnail picture of how the three principles that govern 
social life – desire, alliance and legitimacy – enact themselves in time.
Significantly, however, the explanatory power of narrative is not restricted 
to our day-to-day interactions with other people. Because narratives work 
with deeply familiar categories and roles from the social world, they provide 
a convenient conceptual shorthand for reducing complex information or 
threatening unknowns to a more manageable form. Think, for instance, of 
the many mythologies that describe the creation of the world using the logic 
of agency, where gods, demi-gods and humans are attributed responsibility 
for natural phenomena. It is, in fact, only relatively recently in human history 
that scientific models of natural phenomena have begun to supersede 
narrative ones. Equally, narratives serve to simplify complex historical and 
political realities by collapsing a multitude of individual actions into that of a 
religion, ethnicity, nation or gender. In some cases, this is an empowering 
process that uncovers possibilities for collective action where none before 
existed. In other cases, narratively mediated thinking is an exercise in power 
that serves only to disqualify the moral or intellectual claims of out-group 
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members – regardless of the evidence that may be presented in support of 
these claims.
Figure 5b: Science as a quest for truth
Even when we are not explicitly engaged in narrative thinking, we often 
frame what we are doing in narrative terms. This can be seen in how the 
scientific enterprise is conceived of by its proponents. Specifically, though 
science itself is non-narrative in character, it is frequently presented in the 
form of a quest, where the scientist, aided by ingenuity and dispatched 
by curiosity, combatively wrestles with the complexities of nature (or 
alternatively with those who dismiss the validity of the science) with a view 
to retrieving (or defending) truth for the benefit of humanity (Figure 5b). The 
story can readily be inverted, presenting the scientist instead as the alarmist 
or dishonest hand of establishment thinking, with whom the enlightened 
and virtuous dismisser, energised by truth, must engage in rhetorical battle 
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Figure 5c: Climate dismissal as a revelation of distortion and hoax
Ultimately, the point to retain is that narrative is a mode of thinking that 
originated in the demands of the social world. This makes it a superlatively 
useful tool for explaining as a unified and satisfying package of facts and 
motivations why people believe and act the way they do. However, it also 
means that narrative is less concerned with conveying objective truth than it 
is with pressing truth into the service of partisan social objectives. Certainly, 
this does not rule out narrative being harnessed to progressive social ends 
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4.2  Science Communication Basics
So what role has narrative in the communication of climate science? We 
noted in Section 1.4 that in reporting their work to their peers, scientists 
traditionally adopt a standardized format (‘objective–method–results–
conclusions’). Specialized terminology is employed, including the language 
of mathematics, as are sophisticated styles of visual display and analysis. 
The material presented is predominantly factual. The objective is to 
maximize the transfer of information and minimise the time and effort 
taken to do so. A key condition for success is that the ‘expert’ audience 
is familiar with necessary contextual knowledge – usually extensive, 
technical and nuanced. Researchers are trained and practised in this style 
of delivery186 and are judged by their peers on their proficiency at doing so. 
A consequence is that those same researchers, steeped in their specialist 
practice, can find it difficult to recast their presentations for a lay audience. 
Partial or complete communications failure follows as a result, since the 
audience is unfamiliar with the delivery format, and is ill-equipped to 
evaluate the technical detail.
When this occurs (assuming engagement is not entirely lost) audience 
attention tends to focus on three questions: ‘Does this person know what 
they are talking about?’, ‘Are they trustworthy?’ and ‘Do they share my 
cultural values and beliefs?’87. Depending on the answer to each question, 
the opinion of the presenter – as far as it can be deduced – is likely to be 
accepted or rejected. In other words, the material delivered is used to 
evaluate the scientist, not the science. 
However, scientists are deeply reluctant to express opinions or judgements, 
even when confronted with or challenged by the opinions of others. The 
imperative to stick to the facts is a deep cultural norm. This is despite the 
argument (Section 1.3) that, as especially well-informed citizens, they have 
a right – if not an obligation – to express an opinion or judgement (with 
appropriate caveats and making clear the distinction). Not doing so often 
results in public and official frustration at what is perceived as a bewildering 
and annoying reticence to speak out.
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When confronted with a communication breakdown, scientists tend to 
adopt the information-deficit approach, and to deliver more facts (or the 
same facts more slowly), assuming that information drives understanding 
and acceptance. But we have seen that delivering more information can 
worsen conflict over decision-making (Section 1.1), and cannot reconcile 
opposed attitudes (Section 2.4). So although the ‘deficit’ approach can be 
useful in some circumstances (e.g. for clarifying a point, countering an error 
or misunderstanding, and for establishing credentials), it is well known by 
expert communicators to be ineffective in general. Adam Corner187 likens 
scientific facts to the words in a dictionary, which on their own are not 
very interesting, but once assembled into a story or poem can capture the 
imagination.
Numerous guides offer advice on avoiding common communication pitfalls 
such as the use of specialized or ambiguous terminology, overly complex 
slides, or too much technical detail188. Some delve deeper187, 189–192, and 
some specifically recommend the adoption of a narrative-based approach. 
For example, Caroline van den Brul193 draws on her experience as a BBC 
Science producer and editor, and more recently as a communications 
trainer, to promote the importance of issues such as the needs and 
interests of the audience, the use of emotion, the use of ‘lures’, the need 
to set detail in context, the need to project a ‘human’ yet authoritative 
image, and the power of puzzles and plots to raise curiosity and achieve 
engagement.
The origins of such advice can be traced back to Aristotle194 who fully 
understood the importance in rhetoric of ethos (how well the presenter 
persuades the audience he or she is qualified to speak), pathos (appeal 
to the audience’s emotions – directly or via metaphor or simile) and 
logos (the use of logic). Working with members of the arts and museums 
communities, who are familiar with making such connections and with 
provoking new thinking, offers a potentially powerful way forward, in which 
the role of the scientist is to ensure that the scientific content is rigorous 
and robust. Examples include Cape Farewell195, Tipping Point196 and 
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the London Science Museum’s gallery; atmosphere: Exploring Climate 
Science197, 198.
Important though these issues are, they are only part of the story. In 
Chapter 3 we identified a variety of challenges that threaten the public 
standing of climate scientists and climate science. To be effective, a 
narrative presentation designed for a lay audience needs to take all 
these considerations into account. The objective is to integrate actors, 
motivations, facts and conclusions into a construct that, conforming to 
the narrative structure described in Section 4.1, provides a story that ‘fits 
together’ to produce a deep feeling of ‘rightness’ and certainty. If this is 
not done explicitly (as we have seen in Section 2.1) it will be done anyway, 
consciously or unconsciously, as the mind seeks to draw ‘meaning in 
context’. Better therefore to provide the intended interpretation explicitly.
We do not attempt to construct such a crafted narrative here, but instead 
provide an illustration of the power of well-judged storytelling, drawn from 
an account of a debate on climate change, in which a persuasive counter-
narrative overwhelmed a carefully constructed exposition of the science. Ro 
Randall’s blog describes a public debate on climate change199:
“What stays in my mind is not the measured explanations of science, 
but (the opponent’s) soup of random fact and populist story-telling. ... 
At one level, his speech was rubbish. He offered little argument. His 
facts were mostly wrong or irrelevant. He was incoherent on science 
and ignorant on policy. However, he offered an immediate emotional 
connection for his audience. He did this by presenting himself as 
the common man and the voice of common sense, appealing to 
stolid, British values such as plain-speaking, no-nonsense, down-
to-earth honesty. He connected with some powerful emotions, such 
as people’s fear of wasting money, and fear of ‘having one put over 
on you’ by people more powerful than you. He connected, through 
mockery, to a strand of anti-intellectualism and contempt for clever 
people who are deemed to create clever theories in lieu of seeing 
the plain truth in front of their eyes. … He was also a storyteller. His 
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speech was peppered with anecdote and visual imagery … that 
hooked the audience’s imagination. Fundamentally, (he) connected 
to the desire in everyone that climate change should turn out not 
to be happening. … Who would not prefer that the bad news is 
wrong? He then built on this basic emotional connection by creating 
an enemy that can be blamed for frightening people (scientists and 
environmentalists) and provided a story about their motivations 
(personal profit and political gain) that could explain this.”
4.3  discourse not debate
It is commonly assumed that contested societal issues can and should 
be resolved through debate. Examples abound, from school debating 
societies to the daily business of the British Parliament. But debates 
assume that there is only one right answer. They are combative in 
nature, and are about listening for flaws, defending assumptions and 
pursuing a predetermined outcome. They are about winning – and losing. 
Furthermore their outcomes are vulnerable to bias as a result of ‘debate 
asymmetry’ (Section 1.1) and ‘false balance’ (Section 3.4). By rehearsing 
their arguments, and through the impact on self-esteem of loss or gain, 
participants are driven further down their respective sides of the pyramid 
(Figure 3), and hence further apart in their convictions. Debate increases 
polarization. Yet the recognition that debate has unhelpful outcomes is 
not novel; it was the flawed nature of debate that motivated Socrates to 
propose dialectics as a preferred alternative.
The advantages of dialectic – or dialogue – are manifold. The starting 
assumption is that all participants have useful contributions to make. The 
approach is collaborative, is at least as much about listening as it is about 
speaking, and is aimed at finding common ground (and hence draws on 
the potential for reducing antagonism through working for a common 
purpose discussed in Section 2.5). It focuses on exploring assumptions, 
discovering new possibilities and seeking constructive progress. It offers 
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a means of resolving issues ideal for the ‘co-production’ approach to 
science–policy interaction (Section 2.1).
Where it has been practised, it has been shown to work. For example, 
Ellen McCallie and her co-authors200 describe the successful development 
of dialogue events at the London Science Museum’s Dana Centre with the 
goal of “creating circumstances such that … sustained dialogue between 
scientists and public participants occurs”. Experience of a longstanding 
programme of such events showed that the creation of such a ‘safe space’ 
allowed high levels of interaction and learning, and created circumstances 
under which people were able to keep an open mind, opinions could 
shift201, 202.
We might ask, then, given its failings, why the debate format remains 
ubiquitous? First and foremost it may result from a determination on the 
part of either party to prevail over their opponents, with debate offering 
means to achieve this, and to be seen to do so. More pragmatic factors 
emerged from the Dana Centre experience; dialogue events are more 
complex and costly to deliver, requiring multiple breakout spaces, a greater 
number of ‘experts’, and more complex planning and orchestration. They 
are also difficult to scale up, with the need to achieve effective interaction 
between public and experts limiting participants to a maximum of 50–100.
But probably the most powerful – and insidious – reason is that a debate 
is a form of contest – and hence entertainment. As a result, it appeals to 
an audience who may or may not be interested in (or pay attention to) 
the content. It offers the vicarious pleasure of observing a battle in which 
fortunes ebb and flow as opponents fight for supremacy. For media seeking 
to attract viewers or to sell copy, a preference for the debate format is 
readily understood.
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4.4  summary
In this section we have explored the origins and social function of narrative 
and have seen that it provides a powerful means to communicate a 
package of facts and motivations in a unified manner that can ‘feel right’. 
We have noted that it is capable of conveying truth and untruth with 
equal force, and hence when employed in the service of science requires 
attendant care. We have noted that scientists, by and large, are unpractised 
in the use of narrative and that their communication with lay audiences 
could benefit from developing that skill. We have noted that in doing so, the 
construction and delivery of an effective climate science narrative needs to 
address a variety of factors, particularly that the subject matter is complex, 
unwelcome, inconvenient and contested. We have noted that in public 
discourse debate is combative and increases polarization. In contrast the 
use of dialogue is collaborative and seeks a constructive way forward, even 
in the light of irresolvable differences. We observe that dialogue provides a 
mode of discourse consonant with the role of the ‘Honest Broker’ and the 
co-production approach to science-policy interaction, which is more likely 
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   There is widespread public acceptance of the reality of climate 
change, but not of the urgency and scale of the challenges it 
presents. This is at odds with the conclusions of climate science.
   The discrepancy derives from psychological factors and from 
clashes with deeply rooted values and political divisions.
   There is a need to reframe the debate on climate change and 
climate science in a constructive way that enables progress 
beyond entrenched positions, which engages both policymakers 
and the lay public in discourse about the scientific evidence and 
the appropriate policy responses.
5.1 Opinion Polls: What They Show 108
5.2 Factors Influencing Public Opinion 109
5.3 Multiple Publics 110
5.4 Summary 113
108     How Climate Change Features in the Public Consciousness
5.1  opinion Polls: What they show
Results from opinion polls need to be interpreted with caution, since the 
information upon which they are based can deviate widely from people’s 
unconscious thoughts and real behaviours. Nevertheless, polling data 
consistently indicate that public awareness of climate change is relatively high 
(over 80%). Polls sponsored in the UK by the Department of Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), and other research surveys conducted 
using nationally representative samples, regularly find that majorities say they 
know ‘a lot’, a ‘fair amount’ or ‘a little’ about climate change203–207. Majorities 
also agree that human actions are a significant driver of contemporary 
climate change, and express worry, to some degree, about its impacts207–211. 
Comparative polls conducted in the USA reveal similar findings212–218. Roger 
Pielke Jr24 points out that these results are remarkable, revealing a level of 
public consensus far in excess of other issues on which political action is 
routinely taken. However, whilst these publics broadly accept that climate 
change is occurring, and that human activity plays at least some role in this, 
research has identified that the publics in the West are likely to regard climate 
change as temporally and spatially distant, and more serious for other people 
and in other places219–224.
Despite consistent high awareness, levels of concern have fluctuated over 
recent years. Data from within the UK and USA, for example, demonstrate 
that between 2007 and 2010 the number of individuals worried about the 
issue fell209, 212, 225–227. Subsequent evidence is inconclusive, with some polls 
indicating that attitudes may have stabilized207, 214, others indicating that the 
trend may have reversed215, 216. The percentage of the British public who 
are ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ concerned about climate change apparently 
increased from 27% in 2010 to 35% in 2013228.”
Numerous theories have been put forward concerning the drivers of  public 
concern. Robert Brulle et al investigated five factors: extreme weather events, 
public access to accurate science information, media coverage, elite cues 
and competing advocacy229. They found that information and extreme events 
had little effect. Media coverage did exert an important influence, but this 
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coverage was itself influenced by elite cues and economic factors. They 
concluded that political mobilization by elites and advocacy groups was 
critical. Nick Pidgeon, evaluating similar data, identified possible drivers as 
‘issue fatigue’, the impact of the global financial crisis, and the deepening 
politicisation of the issue229, 230. Other possible factors include loss of trust, 
and the impact of ‘false balance’ in the media (Section 3.4). Potentially 
important, but as yet uncertain, is the impact of an increasing number  
of public attacks on climate scientists and their institutions via newspaper 
articles4, 5, blogs231, publications from right-wing think-tanks232 and  
books151, 233–235. Allegations range from scientific dishonesty to political 
motivation and participation in a global conspiracy to perpetrate a  
self-interested hoax147, 151, 234.
5.2  Factors Influencing Public Engagement
There is a growing literature examining the factors that influence how and 
why publics engage (or disengage) with climate change. Affective imagery – 
taken here to be feeling states associated with a particular word or idea236 – 
has been found to play a role in whether or not individuals perceive climate 
change as a risk issue, and the degree to which they support or oppose 
policy measures designed to mitigate the threat98, 100, 219, 237.
Engagement with climate change also shows a correlation with political 
beliefs and world-view, with research finding that support or opposition 
to climate policy is strongly associated with voting preferences. In the 
American context, people who identify themselves as Democrats are more 
likely to perceive climate change as a risk and support climate change 
policies than those who identify themselves as Republican217, 238. Polls show 
an increasing degree of divergence of Democratic–Republican views about 
climate change. An anti-climate-change stance is also prominent within the 
‘New Right’ in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and, increasingly, the UK, 
where those committed to small government, free markets and individual 
initiative actively seek to associate climate change with other iconic right-
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wing ‘bêtes noir’. For example, writers such as James Delingpole, in his 
book Watermelons: The Green Movement’s True Colours147, characterize 
environmentalists as “green on the outside, red on the inside”, consistent 
with the view that environmentalism is perceived by the right as replacing 
communism as the ‘enemy’ following the fall of the Soviet Union. These 
partisan differences point to the underlying importance of cultural world-
views, including egalitarianism and individualism, as more fundamental 
drivers of public reaction87, 239 (see Section 2.6). The tension between such 
deep ideological differences is a key driver of human affairs, underscoring 
the need to disentangle climate science from such issues, which by their 
nature are ongoing and highly intractable.
5.3  multiple Publics
There exists no single ‘public’ when considering climate attitudes and beliefs. 
Edward Maibach et al240 used a segmentation model to explore US public 
engagement with climate change. From a nationally representative survey of 
approximately 2,000 American adults, six segments were identified covering 
a spectrum of concern ranging from ‘alarmed’, ‘concerned’ and ‘cautious’, 
to ‘disengaged’, ‘doubtful’ and ‘dismissive’. Each segment had a unique 
perspective on climate change with respect to policy preferences, and issue 
engagement’ after ‘behaviours’ beliefs and self-reported behaviours. The 
approach has been replicated in numerous subsequent surveys both within 
the USA and more internationally241–245. Numbers and segments vary from 
nation to nation and over time, but the spectrum and distribution of opinion in 
each show broad agreement.
Here we suggest that, from the point of view of communication, the 
segmentation can be considered in terms of three simplified functional 
subsets. The first – the ‘Acceptors’ – constitute those members of the 
‘alarmed’ and ‘concerned’ (including ‘alarmists’) who seek to persuade 
policymakers and the lay public that human-induced climate change is real 
and merits a response. The second subset is the ‘Dismissers’, consisting 
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of the ‘doubtful’ and the ‘dismissive’ (including ‘dogmatists’) who seek to 
persuade the opposite). The third group constitute the ‘Middle Ground’, 
who are disinterested, disengaged or unpersuaded (Figure 6a).
Figure 6a: Illustrating the struggle for influence over climate change
A common misconception is that the climate scientists form a substantial 
component of the Acceptor group operating in an ‘Issue Advocacy’ role; 
in practice, as pointed out in Section 1.3, there is a general reluctance on 
their part to do so, with only a relatively small subset operating in this way. 
That is not to say that ‘stealth advocacy’ does not occur. And it is certainly 
the case that senior climate scientists have a substantial influence over 
decision-making and policy, albeit in mainly in the ‘technocratic’ mode 
(Section 1.5). But the key point of Figure 6a is that it is represents the 
situation as a struggle between opposing forces – an instantly recognizable 
but unhelpful narrative. Given our conclusions about the need to 
disentangle climate science from ideology and politics, the advantages  
of dialogue over debate, and the benefits of decision-making through  
co-production (Section 1.2), this is highly undesirable.
Acceptors middle ground dismissers
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Our conclusion then, is that for the good of society in addressing the 
issue of climate change, a prime objective should be to reframe the 
engagement, so that combative situation illustrated in Figure 6a is replaced 
by a co-production forum in which all interested parties are represented, 
in which the climate science community is embedded within a grouping 
of independent expert participants separate from the advocacy groups, 
in which the media and internet provide a connection to society as a 
whole, and in which the driving principle is to seek ‘common purpose’ and 
evidence-based, pluralist decision-making seeking to optimize societal 
benefit (Figure 6b).
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5.4  summary
In this Section we have noted that (in the UK and USA at least) polls 
indicate high levels of public awareness of climate change, and a relatively 
high degree of acceptance that human actions are its cause. We have seen 
that differences of opinion on climate change are rooted in differences of 
values, world-view and political ideology. We have seen that subsets of 
society committed to action – both those for and against a response – seek 
to influence power brokers and the lay public. We have suggested that for 
constructive progress to be made, it is imperative to find ways to defuse 
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KeY PoiNtS
   Although numerous climate scientists are active in public engagement 
and policy formulation, they are the exception. For the majority 
the primary focus remains their ‘Pure Scientist’ role. The academic 
training systems and rewards structures provide limited capability or 
incentives for this to change.
   no mechanism currently exists to reconsider and reform the cultural 
norms and practices of climate science.
   The establishment of an operational body to fulfil the role of ‘Science 
Communicator’ could enable new types and levels of discourse 
between climate scientists, decision-makers, policymakers and the 
lay public. 
   The establishment of a professional body for climate science, to 
represent the interests of climate scientists and society, would provide 
the means to develop norms, values and practices better tuned to the 
circumstances in which climate science finds itself.
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6.1  What Would It Be Like?
We began this commentary with Jane Lubchenco’s 1997 appeal to the 
environmental science community to “participate vigorously in exploring 
the relationship between science and society and in considering a New 
Social Contract for Science as we enter the Century of the Environment”. 
Lubchenco recognised that in a world increasingly dominated by humans, 
environmental issues merited serious public and political consideration, 
and that as a consequence, scientists needed to rethink their role and 
objectives, and hence their behaviours. It was a call to establish a new 
ethos of cultural norms, values and practices.
In the intervening years numerous developments have served to intensify the 
imperative. These include changes within human interconnectivity through 
globalization and the growth of the internet, advances in the understanding 
of the human mind, and the development of the partisan political divide over 
climate science. Yet in practice, notwithstanding the efforts of many individual 
scientists to engage with the public and with policy formulation, and despite 
ongoing initiatives to foster cross-disciplinarity (Section 3.8), changes in 
the collective working practices of climate science have been modest. The 
‘vigorous exploration’ has not taken place and the New Social Contract has 
not been forged.
What if it had, and what if climate science had transformed itself as a 
result? What would it look like? 
Firstly, there would be a clear understanding about the climate science 
community’s purpose. This would encompass the five roles discussed in 
Chapter 1, acknowledging a collective obligation to expand and deepen 
understanding of the climate system, to engage with society about it in a 
relevant and meaningful way, to answer factual (‘positive’) enquiries, and to 
participate actively in related societal decision-making.
Secondly, there would be a clear understanding about the community’s 
objectives: to provide expert support to society, to identify better or 
more acceptable options, to inform multiple ‘no or low regrets’ practical 
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actions as a pathway to the longer-term, and to emphasise the need 
to accommodate irreducible uncertainties, whilst being vigilant to avoid 
advocacy either directly or by stealth.
Thirdly, the mode of engagement with society would have been 
transformed and refined. This would have been achieved via a structured 
(science-based) approach to implement the ‘Science Communicator’ role 
and to encourage the co-production model of science–policy interactions, 
with the objective of ensuring their effectiveness, as well as their 
internalization as professional norms.
Fourthly, recognizing the importance of the science analogue of ‘brand 
DNA’ in developing and sustaining a positive public standing, the 
community would have established and made clear new behavioural 
standards and new consistency of narrative in a manner to maximize 
positive ‘affect’. In so doing, they would have addressed the variety of 
issues raised in this report, including the need to:
•  recognize the realities of the science–policy interface and take steps to 
separate the ongoing and essential fundamental (‘pure’) study of the 
climate system, from activities designed to support decision-making and 
the policy discourse
•  recognize and acknowledge the inherent limitations of the human mind (‘We 
are all less consciously rational than we think’), and the consequent inability 
of individual scientists to achieve their behavioural aspirations, as well as the 
origins of dismissal and antagonism within a subset of the audience
•  strengthen the reality and public perception of the validity and 
effectiveness of the scientific process at revealing objective reality and its 
value in informing policy and decision-making
•  welcome and actively expand the democratization of science via the 
internet and other means
•  avoid, to the extent possible, the array of pitfalls identified regarding 
the content of climate science messaging (e.g. lack of consistency, 
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oversimplification, emphasis on uncertainty rather than risk,  
over-emphasis on the value of predictions)
•  become storytellers – making judicious use of metaphor and verbal 
imagery – to engage constructively and interest society in the results and 
implications of climate science
•  personalize the science, and, where appropriate and with necessary 
caveats, express opinions and judgements.
Fifthly, in an attempt to reduce the polarized and unhelpful nature of the 
public discourse, discussion would take place through dialogue rather than 
debate, ‘safe spaces’ for co-production would have been established with 
the aim of setting aside differences and identifying common purpose, with 
an emphasis on ‘bigger than self’ issues, that transcend ideologies and 
political affiliations. Key ingredients of the discussion would be a better 
understanding of, and positive engagement with, different concepts of 
uncertainty and risk, and an admission on the part of all parties that ‘I might 
be wrong’, coupled with active critical reflection, and the channelling of the 
dissonance generated into positive thinking and action.
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6.2  mind the gap
So what could be done to close the gap between this vision and the 
present-day reality? To address this it is first helpful to consider why the 
transformation has not taken place.
At its root, Lubchenco’s New Social Contract requires a substantial  
reform of climate scientists’ roles and behaviours. Susan Michie and her  
co-authors246 have developed a generalized framework to analyze, 
characterize and address behavioural change challenges. The Behavioural 
Change Wheel identifies three factors that are necessary and sufficient 
prerequisites for the performance of a specified volitional behaviour. These 
are motivation (the brain processes that energise and direct behaviour), 
capability (these may be physical or psychological, the latter being the 
knowledge and skills necessary for the behaviour) and opportunity (the 
physical and social context that enables or promotes the behaviour). 
Motivations may be ‘reflective’, in the sense that they involve analyzing the 
cost and benefits of a given course of action (e.g. belief that an activity is 
‘wrong’ or ‘harmful’), or ‘automatic’, in the sense that they involve drives, 
emotional processing and habits. Any given behaviour in its context can 
be analyzed within this framework, revealing the location and nature of the 
issues that are blocking progress and the alterations that are required for 
the behaviour to change.
In the case of transforming the norms, values and practices of climate 
science, motivation presents a significant obstacle. We have noted that the 
prime motivational driver for most researchers is carrying out their science 
(Section 1.3). As the climate science enterprise has expanded, ever-larger 
numbers of researchers have found themselves “privileged to be able to 
indulge their passion”. As a result, there has been little incentive for already 
busy individuals to take on additional demanding commitments in areas of 
climate science communication the science–policy interface for which they 
have little training or experience. Factors reinforcing the situation are the 
academic rewards system, which continues to place priority on publishing 
original research, and a pervasive prejudice amongst scientists that 
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‘outreach’ activities are lower status than, and a distraction from, the main 
objective (i.e. understanding and predicting the climate system)40.
Those individuals who have engaged in such activities, with notable 
exceptions, have tended to be drawn from the more established members 
of the community. These figures are arguably better able to take the time 
and the risk (as well as being seen as more ‘expert’), having more freedom 
of control over their schedules and being more secure in their posts. 
Although they have been rewarded through increased status, influence 
and access to power, many have found the consequences double-edged, 
having become the target of attack within the blogosphere and the media. 
At the institutional level, the experience has been similar.
Even assuming it were possible to generate a ‘strong intention’, a second issue 
blocking progress concerns capability. Typically, once objectives have been 
agreed the execution of transformational change requires a combination of 
know-how, and strong leadership. We have noted the general lack of familiarity 
of climate scientists with the insights of the political and behavioural sciences 
(representing highly relevant know-how), and this is undoubtedly an obstacle.
More fundamentally, the science community is ‘self-organising’ and not 
amenable to authoritative direction (see also Section 1.4). This is a cherished 
principle, enshrined within the UK by the Haldane Principle247, which ensures 
that the focus of research is under the control of scientists, free from political 
and administrative pressures. Similar arrangements apply in most nations 
worldwide. The unwitting consequence is the lack of an instrument or means 
by which collective reform can be addressed. In addition to protecting science 
against political manipulation, the situation is analogous to that of the free 
market in which it is assumed that the ‘invisible hand’, corresponding to the 
aggregate consequences of countless individual decisions, drives progress 
more effectively than centralized control. As is the case for the financial 
markets, the scientific enterprise is vulnerable to its insensitivity to externalities 
that by definition have no influence on individual decisions. In the case of 
climate science, the need to better serve society is one such externality. The 
need to overcome cross-disciplinary barriers is arguably another.
Time for Change?                  121
For free markets, the curative mechanism is regulation. But this is only 
possible through the intervention of a higher authority, typically government 
regulation through law. As we have seen, the science enterprise has 
been established in a manner designed specifically to prohibit such 
intervention. The challenge then is to find a means by which change can 
be effected voluntarily, retaining the integrity of the Haldane Principle, yet 
achieving the psychological capability (engaging in the necessary thought 
processes of comprehension and reasoning) and the physical capability 
(developing an instrument and mechanisms) to make progress. To foster 
cross-disciplinarity (and international coordination) the solution adopted was 
to establish the Global Change programmes that derive their legitimacy from 
their sponsorship by the international science bodies (World Meteorological 
Organization, International Council of Science, International Social Science 
Council). We build on this approach in the next Section.
Regarding opportunity, the situation is mixed. Concerning communication, 
despite a view within some parts of the media that climate science is ‘toxic’ 
and hence a risky subject in which to invest effort, there is evidence that 
the lay public are interested to learn more in order to be able to ‘make up 
their own minds’. This is illustrated by the popularity of public lectures, 
articles and books on the subject, and, for example, by the experience of 
the ‘atmosphere’ gallery at London’s Science Museum197 (two million visitors 
in just over two years), and by the success of the museum’s Dana Centre 
dialogue events.
Concerning the science–policy interface we have noted the inappropriateness 
of the ‘technocratic model’, the danger of the ‘Iron Triangle’ (Section 1.5), 
and the need to shift responsibility and accountability for society’s decisions 
on the results of climate science back to the democratically-elected 
politicians and decision-makers. Although examples of scientist involvement 
in co-production-like activities exist (see Section 1.5), and although 
references to its desirability can be found, these are the exception rather 
than the rule. For example the Research Councils UK Strategic Vision248 
and Pathways to Impact249 betray their origins in the ‘technocratic’ mindset 
and are far from conforming to the concept outlined by Mike Hulme (Section 
122     Rising to the Challenge
1.2) and illustrated in Figure 6b. In practice this may prove the most difficult 
obstacle to overcome, since it confronts the difficulty of changing established 
practices in policy formulation and decision-making that lie outside the 
influence of climate scientists.
6.3 What next?
We have seen that the ethos and practices of the climate science 
community, forged in the immediate post-Second World War era, require 
reform to meet the needs of modern society better. In Section 6.1 we 
identified areas in which current practices require attention, and in Section 
6.2 we identified obstacles to progress. These represent a substantial 
challenge. But, given the lessons of branding (Section 3.2) and the insights 
from our broader explorations, we reduce the complexity to six fundamental 
needs, that if resolved would represent a major advance:
1.  The establishment of a forum for an active and authoritative public 
conversation about the results and implications of climate science.
2.  The ability of climate scientists to identify themselves and demonstrate 
professional credentials.
3.  The means to represent climate science with authority in its dealings with 
society (decision-makers, politicians and the lay public) and to engage 
with all relevant parties in a cooperative, co-production approach, 
seeking common purpose and the common good.
4.  The means to promote high standards of education and training, and in 
particular to prepare climate scientists for each of the five idealized roles 
they may choose or be required to fulfil at different times.
5.  The means to define and ensure professional standards of work and 
behaviour, including a commitment on the part of accredited scientists to 
aspire to these.
6.  The establishment of a means by which all of the above can be 
discussed, agreed and worked towards.
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We also note the conclusions of the recent House of Commons Science 
and Technology Select Committee report on Communicating Climate 
Science which demonstrate considerable parallels with the outcomes of 
this Commission:
“A lack of clear, consistent messages on the science has a detrimental 
impact on the public’s trust in climate science. The Government 
and other bodies, such as the Royal Society and the Met Office, 
are currently failing to make effective use of [the] internet or social 
media to engage with the public and to become an authoritative 
source of accurate scientific information about climate change. The 
Government must work with the learned societies, national academies 
and other experts to develop a source of information on climate 
science that is discrete from policy delivery, comprehensible to the 
general public, and responsive to both current developments and 
uncertainties in the science. The Government’s current approach to 
communicating conflates the scientific basis of climate change and 
the proposed solutions to its impacts, and places a heavy reliance on 
individual scientists communicating about the science to justify the 
policy response. Efforts to create a clear narrative that is coherent, 
constructive and results in proper public engagement have been 
disappointing. As a matter of urgency, the Government needs to draw 
up a climate change communication strategy and implement this 
consistently across all departments.”
Addressing the lack of an effective Science Communicator, we suggest the 
establishment of an operational body with two-fold purpose: 
•  to deliver persistently a ‘meta-narrative’ which is accurate, engaging, 
coherent and relevant, and which – by making clear the limits of certainty 
and knowledge – is robust against new discoveries and unfolding events
•  to support public discourse on the results and implications of climate 
science, thereby building engagement, understanding and trust. Whilst 
various attempts have been made to fulfil the former role – ranging, 
for example, from the climate-supportive websites such as Skeptical 
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Science44 and RealClimate45, through to the Climate Outreach and 
Information Network (COIN)250 and the Carbon Brief251 – none has 
achieved the necessary combination of authority, operational capability, 
trust and active public engagement.
The additional needs listed above correspond to the functions performed 
by professional associations. Such bodies seek to further the interests of 
a given profession, the interests of individuals engaged in the profession, 
and the public interest. Within the UK they are generally non-profit bodies 
established by Royal Charter or under British law. In the case of climate 
science, given its international nature, a free-standing professional body 
could be established voluntarily by the community, exploiting the internet. 
An alternative, which would carry greater legitimacy, would be to develop 
such a body under the auspices of a respected international science 
organisation, such as the Inter-Academy Panel252.
Whichever approach were to be adopted, our view is that such a body – 
possibly called the ‘International Union of Climate Science’ – should be 
formed as a matter of priority. Its purpose would be to establish a new 
norms, values and practices for climate science, better attuned to the world 
in which climate science now finds itself. To do so would provide the practical 
means to facilitate Lubchenco’s call, and thereby to develop climate science 
and climate scientists fit to satisfy the needs of society in the “Century of the 
Environment”.
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6.4  Conclusions
In summary we draw the following conclusions:
1.  Climate scientists are finding themselves ill-prepared to engage with 
the often emotionally, politically and ideologically charged public 
discourse on the evaluation and use of their science. This is proving 
unhelpful to evidence-based policy formulation, and is damaging their 
public standing. As a result, there is a pressing need to re-examine 
and clarify the roles of climate scientists in policy, decision-making and 
public engagement. Their professional norms, values and practices 
need to be reconsidered and revised accordingly. In expanding their 
skills and expertise to better match societal needs, climate scientists 
can benefit from a mutually supportive working relationship with social 
and behavioural scientists, and with experts in public engagement and 
communication. Such reforms alone will not be sufficient to achieve a 
more constructive and effective formulation of policy and an improved 
public discourse, but they provide a crucial step toward those objectives.
2.  A climate science ‘meta-narrative’ is required that delivers the results 
of climate science in a manner that is accurate, engaging, coherent, 
relevant, and which – by making clear the limits of certainty and 
knowledge – is robust against new discoveries and unfolding events. 
Multiple narrative threads, that are consistent and harmonious with 
each other, are necessary both to reflect the complex nature of the 
climate science, and to connect with audiences with different states of 
knowledge, interests, values and needs. 
3.  Policy issues raised by climate science are complicated by many 
factors (e.g. decisions on energy, food and water supplies, quality 
of life, equity, affordability, security, sustainability, societal resilience). 
Whilst climate science can inform such policy deliberations, it cannot 
be their arbiter. Decision-making should not be through the linear 
mode, characterised as ‘truth speaks to power’, but should be by 
means of collective ‘co-production’.
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4.  Efforts to understand the climate system better are important, but they 
should not be allowed to divert attention and effort from decision-making 
and policy formulation based on what is already known. Reducing 
uncertainties in some areas may not be possible. Irreducible uncertainties 
can be addressed using a ‘decision pathways’ approach.
5.  At its root, the public discussion of climate science is as much about 
what sort of world we wish to live in, and hence about ethics and 
values, as it is about immediate and longer-term material risks to human 
wellbeing. This needs to be clearly acknowledged and addressed. 
Establishing a positive and active public discourse requires recognition 
that people have feelings, anxieties, inner conflicts and world-views that 
can make it difficult for them to take information in, but that they are able 
to rise to a challenge if they conclude that there is a need.
6.  New organisational instruments are required to support the public 
discourse on climate science and to achieve necessary professional 
reforms – notably a forum for active public discussion and a professional 
body for climate scientists.
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6.5  Recommendations
Climate scientists have crucial roles to play in the public discourse on climate 
science and in working with others to determine the most appropriate 
societal responses. But, as described in this report, there is a need for the 
climate science community to re-evaluate its role and enhance its capabilities. 
To this end we make five recommendations addressing:
• Communication – developing a coherent and publicly engaged narrative
• Training – gaining additional skills beyond scientific practice
• Policy engagement – pursuing ‘co-production’ of policy decisions
• Leadership – establishing a professional body for climate scientists
•  Self-reflection – seeking a better awareness and control of unconscious 
motivations
Communication: there is a need for an operational means of public 
engagement with climate scientists to deliver a coherent ‘meta-
narrative’ of climate science that conveys the big picture and 
provides the context for discussion of the results, their uncertainties 
and their implications. The authentic and personalised voice of climate 
scientists in the formation and delivery of this ‘meta-narrative’ will be 
crucial. It will require the climate science community to develop and 
discuss the narrative in a way that seeks to increase the transparency of 
the scientific process and to strengthen public participation within it. The 
effective communication of this ‘meta-narrative’ will rely on successful use 
of and engagement with the media and the internet. 
training: there is a need to enhance the training and development 
of climate scientists. Specifically the objective is to equip the community 
with the skills to fulfill the roles of ‘pure scientist’, ‘science communicator’, 
‘science arbiter’, ‘issue advocate’ and ‘honest broker of policy alternatives’. 
This will require effective action on the part of funders and universities to 
support and deliver the necessary training. The broader aim is to strengthen 
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the functioning, transparency and public participation of the climate science 
process and with the degree of public participation within it. 
Policy engagement: Climate scientists should participate actively in 
the ‘co-production’ of policy formulation and the decision-making 
process. This entails contributing their expertise alongside other experts 
and stakeholders to inform the deliberations of those with the authority, 
responsibility and accountability to make decisions. Progress will require 
a willingness and openness on the part of Government and other policy 
stakeholders, as well as climate scientists, to commit to such a approach.
Leadership: a professional body for climate scientists should be 
established to provide a unifying purpose and to offer leadership. Its 
roles should be as follows:
-  Representation: It should seek to represent the interests of scientists and 
of society.
-  Voice: It should provide the means for climate scientists to develop and 
communicate the climate science ‘meta-narrative’ and to work with 
experts in wider aspects of public engagement and communication to 
support this.
-  standards: It should define professional norms, values and practices 
appropriate to societal needs and provide guidance and input to improve 
the training and development of climate scientists.
-  outcome: It should support climate scientists in engaging in  
‘co-production’ of policy by clearly defining the associated roles and 
expectations, and by providing a clear route for engagement between the 
climate science community and policymakers. 
To these ends the body should facilitate a mutually supportive working 
relationship between climate scientists, social and behavioural scientists, 
and key stakeholders, with the aim of applying relevant insights to the 
practice of climate science).
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Self reflection: Active critical self-reflection and humility should 
become the evident and habitual cultural norm on the part of 
all participants in the climate discourse. We need to be vigilant in 
scrutinising how we evaluate evidence and judge others. We are all less 
rational and more rationalizing than we think. 
gloSSARY
abortion Politics – circumstances in which deeply held and opposed 
views rooted in ideology, religion, morals or ethics can be informed but not 
resolved by science; compare Tornado Politics, below. See page 26.
Co-Production model – in which the goals of policy and the means of 
achieving them emerge from an inclusive and iterative process, comprising 
both scientific and non-scientific considerations. See page 29.
debate assymetry – in which the rules of rational discourse have been 
abandoned by some protagonists, typically to the disadvantage of 
scientists. See page 27.
Honest Broker of Policy Alternatives – engages in decision-making, 
contributing knowledge and understanding alongside a range of other 
participants to expand and clarify the scope of choice available, and to 
converge collectively on an agreed way forward; one of Pielke’s idealized 
roles for scientists. See page 31.
issue advocate – engages with a decision-maker seeking to reduce the 
scope of choice available by promoting a particular course of action that 
they justify using their expert knowledge and understanding; one of Pielke’s 
idealized roles for scientists. See page 31.
Linear model between science and policy – characterised as ‘truth 
speaks to power, and power responds’; also called the Technocratic Model. 
See page 26.
Myside Bias – the propensity to only see one’s own side of an argument. 
See page 44.
Post-normal science – when either or both of ‘systems uncertainties’ 
or ‘decision stakes’ are high, under which circumstances traditional 
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methodologies are ineffective. See page 31.
Pure scientist – focused solely on generating ‘facts’ and delivering them to 
the ‘pool of human knowledge’, with no consideration for their use or utility, 
and no direct connection with decision-makers; one of Pielke’s idealized 
roles for scientists. See page 31.
science arbiter – seeks to stay removed from explicit considerations  
of policy and politics but answers factual questions posed by a  
decision-maker; one of Pielke’s idealized roles for scientists. See page 31.
science Communicator – engaged with society to make aware and 
discuss the results and implications of the research that it has funded, 
including the task of raising the alert if the implications of a piece of 
research point to a significant societal threat or opportunity; a proposed 
addition to Pielke’s idealized roles for scientists. See page 35.
stealth issue advocacy – when a researcher either knowingly or 
unwittingly advances a political outcome when apparently focusing solely 
on science. See page 32. 
technocratic model – See Linear Model, above.
tornado Politics – circumstances in which there is a broad consensus on 
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